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Flood Money: The Challenge of U.S. Flood
Insurance Reform in a Warming World

Jennifer Wriggins*
ABSTRACT
Congress’s reforms of the National Flood Insurance Program
(“NFIP”) in 2014 continued its misguided approach to flood insurance
policy, ignoring the increased risks of floods posed by climate change
and giving generous subsidies to flood-prone properties. The Article
analyzes the recent reforms against a backdrop of the NFIP’s history,
impacts, and structure, and makes recommendations for steps Congress
should take when it revisits the program in 2017. The NFIP has
encouraged retention of older flood-prone properties and building in
flood-prone areas, which makes little sense given the risks we face. The
NFIP, deeply in debt to the Treasury Department, rests in part on an
approach to flood risk where risks are pooled but what individuals pay is
often not based on actual flood risk. This solidaristic approach to flood
risk, where the government subsidizes hundreds of thousands of flood
policies, is not based on need or any other credible policy principle.
Further, the justifications for continuing the subsidies are weak
when compared to other contexts where the federal government has been
involved in solidaristic approaches to insurance such as the Affordable
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Care Act, unemployment insurance, and promoting insurance in urban
areas. Congress should gradually remove flood insurance subsidies, fund
accurate maps, and allow rates to be based on risk. Because flood
insurance is mandatory for mortgage-holders in flood-prone areas, and
risk-based rates may be overly harsh for low-income homeowners, a
limited means-tested program should be passed which would allow these
homeowners to receive insurance at reduced rates.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, Congress responded to decades of criticism of the National
Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”), which supplies flood insurance to
homeowners, and passed substantial reforms by a large bipartisan
majority.1 Huge general subsidies for the highest risk properties2 and
massive storms3 led to a debt of $24 billion that the NFIP owed the
1. The 2012 reforms were known as the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform
Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 100201–100249, 126 Stat. 405, 916–69
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130 (2012)). Criticisms have centered on the program’s
deficits, subsidies, environmental effects, incentives, costs, rate-making, communication,
and mapping. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part I.A.4 and Part I.B.2.
3. Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Hurricane Ike in 2008, and subsequent storms such
as Superstorm Sandy have led to very high flood losses. See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER &
ERWANN O. MICHEL-KERJAN, AT WAR WITH THE WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE
RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHE 4–10 (2011) (showing hurricane costs prior to
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Treasury Department.4 In the 2012 reforms, Congress moved away from
the solidaristic approach to flood risk5 that it had used for almost five
decades, which generously subsidized premiums for the highest risk
properties, to an actuarial approach in which premiums eventually would
be based on a house’s actual flood risk.6 Congress also made other

Sandy); Don Jergler, EQECAT: Colorado Floods $2B in Economic Losses and Climbing,
INS. J. (Sept. 20, 2013), http://insurancejournal.com/news/west/2013/09/20/305896.htm
(reporting that the catastrophe modeling firm known as EQECAT estimates $50 billion in
losses from Superstorm Sandy, much of which was insured, and $2 billion from early
September 2013 Colorado floods, only a tiny fraction of which was insured); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-607, FLOOD INSURANCE: MORE INFORMATION NEEDED
ON SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES 2 n.2 (2013) [hereinafter GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES
REPORT] (noting that losses from Superstorm Sandy led to increasing FEMA’s borrowing
limit in January 2013). The response to Katrina highlighted with stunning force some of
the shortcomings of U.S. flood policy. Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders:
Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 7 (2007)
(outlining how the events of Katrina were precisely predicted well in advance but the
response prepared in advance was wholly inadequate). The literature on Hurricane
Katrina is too vast to summarize here. See generally ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS
FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 109 (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettle & Howard C.
Kunreuther eds., 2006) [hereinafter ON RISK AND DISASTER]. The insurance litigation
brought by homeowners to recover some of their losses from Hurricane Katrina
showcased some of the challenges and failures of U.S. flood insurance and U.S. private
insurance. After Hurricane Katrina, it was revealed that many people who should have
had insurance both for flood and other risks did not have it. Donald T. Hornstein, The
Balkanization of CAT Property Insurance: Financing and Fragmentation in Storm Risks,
11 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 7–8 (2013); Charlene Luke & Aviva Abramovsky,
Managing the Next Deluge: A Tax System Approach to Flood Insurance, 18 CONN. INS.
L.J. 1, 11 n.48 (2011); Scales, supra, at 14. Further, many homeowners litigated the
‘concurrent cause provisions’ in their policies, which provided that if a covered cause
(wind) combined with an excluded cause (flood) to cause loss to a homeowner, the entire
loss was not covered. These clauses, which often resulted in homeowners having
minimal or nonexistent coverage, were upheld by the Fifth Circuit. Hornstein, supra, at
12–14.
4. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-127, FLOOD INSURANCE:
STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT 1 (2014) [hereinafter GAO,
2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT].
5. See JOHN O’NEILL & MARTIN O’NEILL, JOSEPH ROWNTREE FOUND., SOCIAL
JUSTICE AND THE FUTURE OF FLOOD INSURANCE (2012), available at
http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/vulnerable-households-flood-insurance-summary.pdf
(explaining solidaristic and actuarial concepts of insurance; a solidaristic approach
involves risk pooling with payment into the pool in accordance with an agreed upon
arrangement usually based on a concept of equity or need; actuarial approach also
involves risk pooling but payments into the pool are based on the best estimate of the
individual’s risk). See generally TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW & POLICY 12–15, 21
(2012) (discussing a solidaristic concept of insurance and the relationship between
insurance and social responsibility); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK:
INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986).
6. An actuarial approach to insurance requires that individuals “bear the costs of
their own risks when you align the costs they face with their associated level of risk.”
O’NEILL & O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 6.
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changes, such as supplying more funds for making accurate maps.7 The
reforms meant that rates of homeowners with properties at high risk of
flood would, in some cases, rise substantially over time. Faced with the
resulting furor over rising rates, in March 2014 Congress reversed many
of the reforms by a large bipartisan majority.8 Congress largely
reinstituted its prior solidaristic approach of huge general subsidies to
high-risk properties while making other changes.9 In 2017, Congress
must revisit the NFIP.10 This Article analyzes this extraordinary saga,
which raises basic issues of governance, risk, the federal government’s
role, and climate change.11 Congress has an opportunity to learn from
the debacle of the failed reforms, and this Article draws lessons from the
reform failure and makes recommendations for steps Congress should
take in 2017.12
Floods, both coastal and riverine, are the most costly form of natural
disaster in the United States.13 Floods from rain in Colorado in 2013 and
from Superstorm Sandy in 2012 resulted in massive human and financial
losses.14 Floods are likely to get much more frequent, severe, and
expensive in the coming decades due to the effects of climate change and
population growth.15 Floods and their costs create huge, interlocking
7. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. No. 112141, §§ 100201–100249, 126 Stat. 405, 916–69 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130
(2012)). See generally Questions About the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act
of 2012, FEMA.GOV, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1912-250459380/bw12_qa_04_2013.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2014) [hereinafter FEMA 2012
Overview]; Summary of Biggert-Waters Act of 2012, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS,
http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_events_2012_cipr_summit_overview.pdf
(last
visited Sept. 19, 2014) [hereinafter NAIC Overview]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-06-497T, GAO’S HIGH-RISK PROGRAM 7 (2006) [hereinafter GAO, 2006
FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH-RISK REPORT] (outlining fiscal issues with flood program).
8. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, §§
3–4, 128 Stat. 1020, 1021–22 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4014(g), 4015).
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. § 100203(b), 126 Stat. at 916 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4026).
11. See infra Parts I–III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. Flood
Insurance,
INS.
INFO.
INST.
(July
2014),
http://www.iii.org/issues_updates/flood-insurance.html [hereinafter INS. INFO. INST.,
Flood Insurance].
14. See, e.g., Jergler, supra note 3 (estimating Superstorm Sandy and Colorado
flooding costs).
15. See generally, e.g., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT AGENCY, 2011-OPPA-01,
ADMINISTRATOR POLICY, FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION POLICY STATEMENT
(2011) [hereinafter FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STATEMENT] (outlining the
agency-wide directive to integrate climate change adaptation planning, including
planning for more intense storms, extreme flooding, and higher sea levels in its
processes); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-359T, GAO’S 2013 HIGHRISK SERIES: AN UPDATE (2013) [hereinafter, GAO, MANAGING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS]
(adding to the GAO’s high-risk list the following: “Limiting the Federal Government’s
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public policy and governance issues, many of which have questions of
risk and insurance at their core. Floods in populated areas raise thorny,
enduring questions about the roles of many actors, including
governments at all levels, the private insurance industry, and individuals,
in paying for flood losses and preventing future losses.16
Compensation of flood losses in the past century has largely come
from the federal government in the form of disaster relief and, since
1968, in the form of flood insurance supplied by the federal
government.17 Among industrialized nations, the United States alone
bears all the underwriting risk of these policies.18 At the same time, land
use planning has been largely a local and state governmental concern.19
Private insurance has rarely insured for homeowners’ risk of flood for
more than 50 years.20 Dilemmas concerning what to do about flooding
and insurance are international in scope.21 The general subsidies, costs,
Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks”); AECOM, THE IMPACT OF
CLIMATE CHANGE AND POPULATION GROWTH ON THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM THROUGH 2100 (2013).
16. See infra Part I.A. Debates about the federal government’s role in connection
with floods stretch back to the nineteenth century. DAVID MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS:
GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 258–62 (2001). See generally JAMES M.
WRIGHT, ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, THE NATION’S RESPONSES TO FLOOD
DISASTERS: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT (Wendy L. Hessler ed., 2000) [hereinafter THE
NATION’S RESPONSES] (providing a historical review of governmental responses to
floods).
17. Scales, supra note 3, at 7; GAO, 2006 FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH RISK-REPORT,
supra note 7, at 7.
18. INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13.
19. Scales, supra note 3, at 12.
20. MOSS, supra note 16, at 262 (explaining that private insurance companies
discontinued selling flood insurance by the end of 1928); Luke & Abramovsky, supra
note 3, at 22 (highlighting the absence of a private market for homeowners flood
insurance); GAO, 2006 FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH-RISK REPORT, supra note 7, at 7
(highlighting the absence of a private market for homeowners flood insurance). While
standard homeowners policies exclude flood, generally they cover damage from wind.
However, this wind coverage is being “hollowed out” by policy language, large
deductibles, and in some cases insurers deciding not to cover wind. The most well
known examples are the now-standard concurrent causation clauses, which provide that if
wind damage combines with water damage, the entire loss is uncovered. These clauses
were upheld after Hurricane Katrina in extensive litigation, which was resolved by the
Fifth Circuit. Hornstein, supra note 3, at 6–12. This has led some states to develop
windstorm insurance plans, which, along with state hurricane insurance plans, this Article
does not discuss in detail. See infra Part IV.C. See generally KUNREUTHER & MICHELKERJAN, supra note 3.
21. Climate change and population growth are leading to more and increasingly
costly floods in many parts of the world. See THE WORLD BANK, NATURAL HAZARDS,
UNNATURAL DISASTERS 169–86 (2010); THOMAS F. STOCKER ET AL.,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, at 50 (2013),
available
at
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf.
The
Geneva Association, an international think tank for the insurance industry, considers
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rate-making, and environmental effects of the NFIP have long been
widely criticized,22 and reforms have periodically been made.23 Despite
criticisms of federal flood policies and suspicion of the federal
government, when a flood strikes, officials, communities, and individuals
in flood-stricken communities routinely rely on federal aid.24

climate risk serious and warns that ocean warming may lead to much more severe storm
losses which may overwhelm traditional catastrophe models if adequate mitigation is not
performed in advance. FALK NIEHÖRSTER, GENEVA ASS’N, WARMING OF THE OCEANS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE (RE)INSURANCE INDUSTRY 3 (2013), available at
https://www.genevaassociation.org/media/616661/ga2013-warming_of_the_oceans.pdf;
see also sources cited supra note 15. Currently the United Kingdom, Canada, and many
other countries are struggling with what to do about flooding and insurance. The UK is
considering a plan known as “Flood Re,” which will involve a surcharge on all policies in
order to cover floods, a policy known as “bundling,” since old models have not proven
workable. Tim Ross, Everyone Faces Higher Bills for Flood Insurance, TELEGRAPH
(Aug.
23,
2013,
10:00
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/topics/weather/10263654/Everyone-faces-higher-bills-forflood-insurance.html; The Future of Flood Insurance: What Happens Next, ASS’N
BRITISH
INSURERS,
https://www.abi.org.uk/News/Newsreleases/2013/06/~/link.aspx?_id=E483D07DA3BD43BDB730A671A1C853CA&_z=z
(last updated July 17, 2014). Canada historically has regarded flood risks as uninsurable,
and households have not been able to purchase flood insurance. Canadian P & C
Industry Researching the Possibility of Offering Overland Flood Insurance, CLAIMS
CANADA
(Oct.
2010),
http://www.claimscanada.ca/issues/article.aspx?aid=1000390323&er=NA. The Calgary
floods of 2012 resulted in pressure on insurance companies and government to cover
losses. Jacqueline Nelson, Insurance Brands Feel Force of Floods, GLOBEADVISOR.COM
(July
17,
2013),
http://www.globeadvisor.com/servlet/ArticleNews/story/gam/20130717/RBINSURERSH
AME0716ATL. See also Peter Hannam, Flood Cover Rises to Unaffordable Levels,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.smh.com.au/environment/waterissues/flood-cover-rises-to-unaffordable-levels-20130216-2ejvb.html (discussing flood
insurance issues in Australia).
22. See infra Parts II, III; see, e.g., GAO, 2006 FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH RISKREPORT, supra note 7, at 5; John Tierney, Op-Ed, Ben Franklin Had the Right Idea for
New
Orleans,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
3,
2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/03/opinion/03tierney.html; Judith Kildow & Jason
Scorse, Op-ed, End Federal Flood Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/opinion/end-federal-flood-insurance.html.
23. See infra Parts I and II; see, e.g., Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance
Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-264, 118 Stat. 712 (codified at 42. U.S.C. § 4001
(2006)) (amended 2012). See generally Rachel Lisotta, Comment, In Over Our Heads:
The Inefficiencies of the National Flood Insurance Program and the Institution of
Federal Tax Incentives, 10 LOY. MAR. L.J. 511, 517–524 (2012) (summarizing reforms
prior to 2012).
24. See William P. Marshall, National Healthcare and American Constitutional
Culture, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 144–147 (2012) (highlighting particularly
American distrust of government). Federal disaster aid is triggered by presidential
disaster declarations under the Stafford Act. Gregory J. Lake, Federal and State Disaster
Response: An Introduction, 41 COLO. LAW. 95, 95 (2012). Federal disaster aid
declarations are more common in presidential election years than in off-years.
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 122–126.
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Flooding and the losses it creates present perplexing public policy
dilemmas, which are likely to become even more vexing in the future.
Flood losses raise difficult public policy issues for at least three reasons.
First, flood losses are a problem that all individuals, except the very
wealthy, generally cannot manage on their own; if a home is destroyed
by flood, resources from insurance, government, or some other source
are needed if homeowners are to rebuild. Second, the complex, varied
nature of flood risks makes them particularly challenging from a public
policy point of view. For example, flood risk varies radically between
and within different regions. Further, flood risks are in no one’s
individual control.25 Yet the amount of damages caused by floods also
depends significantly on how properties are constructed, as well as where
they are located.26 Thus, the risks are partly within individuals’ control
and partly beyond it.27 Moreover, flood risks change over time and
require expensive mapping to predict.28 Third, when there is an actual
flood, the losses in a particular area are likely to be astronomical; flood
risks are characterized as “correlated risks” because they lead to very
widespread losses from the same hazard. This potential for extensive
loss makes it very difficult for private companies to profitably sell flood
insurance.29
Two recent developments from outside the field of insurance may
help with the public policy challenges of flood insurance. First, newly

25. The risks of increased severe weather and sea level rise linked with climate
change have been widely publicized. E.g., FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION
STATEMENT, supra note 15. Some people choose to subject themselves to those risks by
buying property in flood-prone areas; others may lack the resources to move, raising
questions about whether living in a flood prone location is a true choice. See generally
Kathleen Tierney, Social Inequality. Hazards, and Disasters, in ON RISK AND DISASTER,
supra note 3, at 109. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.
26.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-429T, FLOOD INSURANCE:
PUBLIC POLICY GOALS PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM 8 (2011) [hereinafter GAO,
2011 PUBLIC POLICY GOALS REPORT] (describing FEMA mitigation efforts and stating
that 30,000 properties had been mitigated using FEMA funds between fiscal years 1997
through fiscal year 2007); INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13 (citing
research that buildings constructed to NFIP standards suffer about a fifth of the damage
annually of buildings not constructed to such standards).
27. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 19–20 (using an example of a group of
people who are more at risk of certain harm and yet may take some precautions against it,
to illustrate complexity of risk classification issues).
28. E.g., FEMA CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STATEMENT, supra note 15.
29. See infra Part II.B (explaining supply and demand side issues connected to flood
insurance); HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER, MARK V. PAULY & STACEY MCMORROW,
INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE MOST
MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY 83–88 (2013) [hereinafter INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS] (explaining effects of correlated risks on insurance supply); Scales, supra
note 3, at 11 (explaining how floods lead to correlated losses, in contrast to other casualty
losses such as fire and auto accidents, which tend to be uncorrelated).
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developed mapping technology will permit a much more nuanced
analysis and dissemination of information about flood risk than was
possible in the past.30 Second, research on how humans evaluate risk and
make decisions has burgeoned during the past few decades. This
research, falling broadly under the rubric of behavioral economics, has
shown that the decision-making behavior of individuals differs in
significant ways from the model predicted by classical economics.31 By
recognizing how human behavior concerning risk differs from traditional
models, this research bears directly on insurance and insurance law and
helps explain some of the otherwise puzzling human behavior
concerning flood insurance.32 With improved mapping data and greater
understanding of how humans make decisions, flood insurance and
policy may be improved.
Governments understandably become involved with floods, flood
risks, and flood costs, but there are no simple economic, political, or
legal responses.33 The dilemma of the federal government’s role
stretches back more than a century.34 It has become a political necessity
for the federal government to supply billions of dollars in disaster relief
annually, although it was not so 100 years ago.35
When government gets involved with insurance, it can take an
approach that is solidaristic, actuarial, or a combination of the two. A
solidaristic approach to insurance is one where risks are pooled, but the
amount an individual pays is not closely tied to the amount of risk faced
by the particular individual.36 The NFIP was based in significant part on

30. See, e.g., Levees and the National Flood Insurance Program, NAT’L ACAD.
SCIS. (2012), http://nas-sites.org/levees/report-summary/ [hereinafter NAT’L ACAD. OF
SCIS., Levee Report]; Dave Owen, Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of
Environmental Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 219 (explaining how mapping technology can
improve environmental law).
31. Works popularizing this research include RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS
(2008) and DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
32. See infra Part II.B.2.
33. See generally Michael J. Trebilcock and Ronald J. Daniels, Rationales and
Instruments for Government Intervention in Natural Disasters, in ON RISK AND
DISASTER, supra note 3, at 89–94 (outlining divergent normative perspectives—
libertarian, corrective justice, economic efficiency, distributive justice, communitarian—
on both the justifications for governmental intervention in natural disasters and the means
that might be used for government to intervene and concluding there are no unitary
answers); Craig Brown & Sara Seck, Insurance Law Principles in an International
Context: Compensating Losses Caused by Climate Change, 50 ALBERTA L. REV. 541,
541–76 (2013) (asserting that there are no probable international solutions to compensate
losses caused by climate change).
34. THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 7.
35. MOSS, supra note 16, at 258–262.
36. O’NEILL & O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 7.

WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

FLOOD MONEY

1/15/2015 3:26 PM

371

a solidaristic approach.37 Solidaristic approaches to insurance are often
used when a particular policy need for broad coverage is considered
compelling, such as Britain’s or Canada’s National Health Service.38
The solidaristic approach contrasts with an actuarial approach, in which
risks are also pooled, but the amount people pay is based on the best
estimates of the risks faced by the individual.39 Private insurance
companies in a functioning market take an actuarial approach.40
Federal flood policy should respond to the growing challenge of
more frequent and destructive flooding. Yet bipartisan majorities have
moved the NFIP in opposite directions in the past two years, first
reforming it in 2012 and then repealing many of those reforms in 2014.
This Article explains how the NFIP started and evolved, how it has
worked, why it is proving so difficult to reform, and how it should be
changed when Congress takes up the issue of flood insurance in 2017.
Part I outlines federal flood policy, highlighting the solidaristic
approach to flood risk which has focused on providing heavily
subsidized flood insurance to risky properties and has resulted in the
NFIP’s current deficit of $24 billion. Part I also outlines the NFIP,
including its evolution, goals, subsidies, bailouts, and the relationships
between floodplain management, disaster relief, and flood insurance.
Part II assesses the NFIP prior to the 2012 reforms, showing how its
goals conflicted—while the reform aimed to save the federal government
money by reducing the amount of property at risk of floods, it also had a
goal of providing flood insurance on “reasonable terms and conditions”
to people who could otherwise not acquire it. Part II also sketches the
many challenges of insuring flood risk, from both a supply and demand
perspective, and highlights insights from behavioral economics that help
explain why demand is so low even though the price is far below cost.
Part II also outlines consequences of the NFIP, including increased
development in flood-prone areas, incentives to not renovate older
properties, and enduring deficits. Part III explains the reforms of 2012
and 2014, explaining how and why the move towards risk-based
actuarial rates and away from solidaristic “affordability” concerns begun
by Congress in 2012 was largely undone in 2014. Part IV offers
recommendations to Congress, suggesting that further continuing the
general subsidies to risky properties, coupled with the incentives these
subsidies create, is unjustifiable, particularly given climate change. The
case for continuing broad subsidies in this context is much weaker than
37. See infra Parts I.A.4, I.B.2.
38. O’NEILL & O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 7. With these national health programs,
the coverage is funded through tax revenues rather than premiums. Id.
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id.
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other contexts where the federal government has been involved with
insurance, such as federal unemployment insurance, urban property
insurance, and the Affordable Care Act. Given the weak case for
subsidies and their negative consequences, Congress should gradually
phase out the general subsidies and require that rates be based on risk.
At the same time, the fact that flood insurance is mandatory for
mortgage-holders suggests that an affordability plan is needed; Congress
should adopt a narrow means-tested program for the truly needy.
Further, although it is extremely unlikely, Congress should pass a
comprehensive framework to deal with the long-term effects of climate
change. Fixing the flood program, by contrast, is a realistic goal. If
mapping of flood risk is protected from political influence, rates are
gradually adjusted to reflect flood risk, and a carefully targeted
affordability plan is included, U.S. flood insurance policy will be
substantially improved.
I.

FEDERAL FLOOD POLICY AND FLOOD INSURANCE: BACKGROUND,
BASICS, AND EVOLUTION

A.

Background and Basics

How and why did the federal government become so deeply
involved in floods and homeowners’ flood insurance? This section
outlines the historical trajectory, basics, and evolution of the NFIP since
its inception in 1968. The historical trajectory begins with flood control,
leads to disaster relief, and then reaches insurance.
1.

Origins of Federal Involvement with Floods: Mississippi
Flooding

The federal government’s involvement in flooding began in the
nineteenth century in connection with periodic inundation of the
Mississippi Delta.41 Locally constructed levees eventually proved
inadequate to protect the growing agricultural communities from
recurrent floods, and as the century wore on, pressure built on Congress
to develop coordinated flood control.42 Starting in 1917, many federal
flood control acts were passed, authorizing levee construction and other
measures aimed at controlling floodwaters.43 Federal disaster aid began
in 1927 when a huge flood along 2000 miles of the Mississippi
41. THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 4–5.
42. Id. at 6; see Mark C. Niles, Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model for Administrative
Evolution, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 353, 392–403 (2011) (analyzing impact of 1927
Mississippi flood).
43. THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 7–12; Scales, supra note 3, at 6.
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devastated multiple communities.44 After 1927, citizens and politicians
increasingly expected disaster relief payments from the federal
government, and payment size grew as population growth, development
in flood-prone areas, and floods continued.45
2.

Flood Insurance Program Origins: A Market Void, the Great
Society, and a Drive Towards Implementation

Insurance came into the picture with the National Flood Insurance
Act of 1968 (the “Flood Act”), which created the NFIP. Concern about
the growing costs of disaster relief, the lack of private insurance
availability, and development in flood-prone areas led to the Flood Act
and later revisions.46
The Flood Act was passed as part of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968 (“HUD Act”), a fact that is seldom noted.47
The HUD Act provided not only for the NFIP but also for urban property
protection and reinsurance.48 Rural interests that wanted flood insurance
(mostly for river flooding at that time) came together with urban interests
that wanted relief from losses to property caused by recent riots; without
both these interests, the NFIP likely would not have come into
existence.49
It is worth reflecting on why the federal government would be
involved in property insurance for individual homeowners. After all, in
the United States, we have a robust private insurance industry that
insures losses to property and an oft-stated preference for markets.50
When homes are mortgaged, lenders require that homeowners purchase
property insurance covering risks to their homes; the vast majority of
homeowners now have this coverage.51 Yet, private homeowners
44. MOSS, supra note 16, at 258; Scales, supra note 3, at 7; Niles, supra note 42.
45. MOSS, supra note 16, at 258–262.
46.
While the insurance industry had opposed prior acts with a similar purpose in
the 1950s, in 1968 the industry supported the proposal. Id. at 262–65.
47. THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 33–34.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 33.
50. This stated preference for markets is much moderated by other considerations
such as the importance to society and legislators of the activity at hand. For example,
automobile insurance is not left to the market; drivers are required to buy liability
insurance and insurance for their own injuries in many states, and insurers in every state
are required to sell liability insurance to high-risk drivers they would rather not insure.
See Jennifer Wriggins, Mandates, Markets, and Risk: Auto Insurance and the Affordable
Care Act, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 275, 301–04, 318–21 (2013). States regulate property
insurance rates for excessiveness, inadequacy, and unfair discrimination. Angelo
Borselli, Insurance Rates: Regulation in Comparison with Open Competition, 18 CONN.
INS. L.J. 109, 128–32 (2011).
51. Scales, supra note 3, at 17–18.
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coverage does not cover flood and water damage and has excluded these
types of losses since at least the mid-twentieth century.52 The federal
government provided flood insurance in part to try to fill this void in the
market coverage of these losses.53 The NFIP was passed in an era when
optimism about the government solving problems was at its zenith and
when a large Democratic majority filled both houses under the leadership
of President Johnson.54 It was part of a shift in government risk
management that took place in the 1960s, emphasizing government
protection of consumers, homeowners, and others from myriad risks.55
The new law had room for a flexible timetable to implement the
flood insurance program, and a number of experts recommended
proceeding with it on a pilot basis.56 Experts recommended caution
because identifying flood hazard areas, setting insurance rates, and
giving technical advice to states and communities on floodplain
management would be very expensive, time-consuming, and
complicated.57 However, the first administrator of the program, in tune
with the spirit of the Great Society, moved aggressively to establish a
national program.58

52. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 84–85; MOSS, supra note 16,
at 262; Scales, supra note 3, at 17; GAO, 2006 FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH-RISK REPORT,
supra note 7, at 6–7; Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 21–22.
53. The congressional findings and declaration of purpose for the National Flood
Insurance Act state:
The Congress also finds that (1) many factors have made it uneconomic for the
private insurance industry alone to make flood insurance available to those in
need of such protection on reasonable terms and conditions; but (2) a program
of flood insurance with large-scale participation of the Federal Government and
carried out to the maximum extent possible by the private insurance industry is
feasible and can be initiated.
42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012). Market failure is a widely accepted reason for the government
to provide insurance, and many believe that there was market failure before the federal
government began providing federal flood insurance. Scales, supra note 3, at 17–18. But
see Eli Lehrer, Watery Marauders: How the Federal Government Retarded the
Development of Private Flood Insurance, ISSUE ANALYSIS, Aug. 2007, at 21–22 (arguing
federal policy such as levee construction and federal government support of flood
insurance made private market sale of flood insurance even more unattractive than it
would otherwise have been). In any event, with barriers to entry like expensive flood
maps and the highly correlated risk of floods, it was not an enticing market for the private
sector. Scales, supra note 3, at 17–18.
54. See Scales, supra note 3, at 19.
55. MOSS, supra note 16, at 8–9, 264.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 4001; THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 33.
57. THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 33.
58. Id. at 34. The term ‘Great Society’ was President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s term
to refer to his legislative agenda in the 1960s, including aid to education, Medicare, urban
renewal, antipoverty programs, expansion of social security, and the Voting Rights Act.
See
Lyndon
B.
Johnson,
WHITE
HOUSE,

WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3.

FLOOD MONEY

1/15/2015 3:26 PM

375

The Flood Act’s Broad Goals for the National Flood Insurance
Program

The Flood Act envisioned several goals for the NFIP. On the one
hand, as phrased by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), the
NFIP was intended “to reduce the federal government’s escalating costs
for repairing flood damage after disasters.”59 On the other hand, its
primary public policy goal was to provide “flood insurance in floodprone areas to property owners who otherwise would not be able to
obtain it,” under “reasonable terms and conditions.”60 Another goal was
to improve floodplain management so that flood losses would be less
severe than they otherwise would be.61 The statute also called for a
unified floodplain management program.62 The ultimate goal was
twofold: (1) that the federal government could develop a workable flood
insurance product that would pay for homeowners’ flood losses, and (2)
that this insurance, coupled with incentives for local communities to
have and enforce land use measures that would reduce the damage from
floods, would ultimately lower the amount of funding needed for federal
disaster relief.63

http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/lyndonbjohnson/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2014).
See generally JOHN A. ANDREW III, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE GREAT SOCIETY (1999).
59. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-631T, NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM, CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS FINANCIAL AND
OPERATIONAL ISSUES 4 (2010) [hereinafter GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED
REPORT].
60. Id. at 5; 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a).
61. The congressional findings and declaration state in part:
[A]s a matter of national policy, a reasonable method of sharing the risk of
flood losses is through a program of flood insurance which can complement
and encourage preventive and protective measures; and if such a program is
initiated and carried out gradually, it can be expanded as knowledge is gained
and experience is appraised, thus eventually making flood insurance coverage
available on reasonable terms and conditions to have persons who have need
for such protection.
42 U.S.C. § 4001(a). Further:
[A] program of flood insurance can promote the public interest by providing
appropriate protection against the perils of flood losses and encouraging sound
land use by minimizing exposure of property to flood losses; and (2) the
objectives of a flood insurance program should be integrally related to a unified
national program for management.
42 U.S.C. § 4001(c). Scales, supra note 3, at 12, 14.
62. “Unified national program for floodplain management[:] The Congress further
finds that . . . (2) the objectives of a flood insurance program should be integrally related
to a unified national program for flood plain management . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c).
63. Scales, supra note 3, at 12, 14. Land use planning is, of course, typically a local
and state concern. Id. at 12.
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The Basic Framework

The broad framework was a carrot approach: if communities in
flood-prone areas adopted floodplain management strategies and land use
codes acceptable to the federal government, the residents of those
communities would be eligible to purchase government-provided flood
insurance which they could not purchase otherwise.64 Even the most
high-risk properties located in flood zones would be sold insurance; no
risk was too great to be insured.65
However, there was no stick to go with the carrot to limit
development in floodplains and ultimately reduce federal disaster relief
costs. Few mechanisms existed to ensure that communities enforced
their land-use regulations.66
Subsidies are a key aspect of the NFIP and have been part of the
program from the beginning. Congress specified that the oldest
properties, those built before 1974 or before the first flood maps were
issued, would receive subsidized flood insurance rates.67 These rates
have been less than half of what actuarial, full-risk rates would be—
between 35 and 45 percent.68 Congress’s rationale for these subsidies
(also known as pre-Flood Insurance Rate Map subsidies or “pre-FIRM”)
was that, in order to encourage participation and because these houses
were not built with flood risk in mind, they should be eligible for deeply
discounted rates.69 Flood insurance policies were standardized, “off-therack” policies, providing limited coverage: a maximum of $250,000 for
64. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 84–85; Scales, supra note 3, at
12; INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13, at 2. If a person lived in a high risk
area and her community did not adopt a management plan, the federal insurance was not
available. However, all or virtually all inhabited flood-prone areas have adopted an
acceptable management plan. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 8.
65. Scales, supra note 3, at 13; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-12,
FLOOD INSURANCE: FEMA’S RATE-SETTING PROCESS WARRANTS ATTENTION 11–18
(2008) [hereinafter GAO, 2008 FEMA’S RATE-SETTING PROCESS REPORT].
66. Scales, supra note 3, at 13; Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 8–11;
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 17; Christine A. Klein & Sandra B.
Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60
SMU L. REV. 1471, 1496–98 (2007).
67. FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7; Scales, supra note 3, at 16; GAO, 2013
SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 9.
68. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-297, ACTION NEEDED TO
IMPROVE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 52 (2011)
[hereinafter GAO, 2011 ACTION NEEDED REPORT] (reporting that rates for older properties
in high-risk zones are 40–45% of what full risk rates would be); INS. INFO. INST., Flood
Insurance, supra note 13 (reporting that subsidized rates have been 35–45% of what full
risk rates would be).
69. FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7; Scales, supra note 3, at 16; GAO, 2013
SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 1, 9. These are also known as “PreFIRM” subsidies. Id.
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the house structure and $150,000 for contents.70 Congress expected that
the subsidies would be temporary, as old, risky houses would be replaced
by new, more flood-resistant homes.71
Another significant characteristic of the NFIP is its allocation of
risk. In an arrangement that the Insurance Information Institute describes
as “unique” in the developed world, the NFIP and the Treasury
Department bore all of the risk of the flood policies written under the
NFIP.72 Private companies selling government policies would take no
risk.
Finally, the government needed to determine which parts of the
country were at high risk of flooding. Consequently, the Flood Act
called for the creation of detailed maps revealing flood risk which would
then be used to set rates.73
B.

Evolution of the National Flood Insurance Program from 19682012

How did the NFIP evolve from its start in 1968 to the 2012
reforms? Throughout its existence, the NFIP has been housed in various
agencies, including first the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”), then the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (“FEMA”), and finally the Department of Homeland Security
(although still within FEMA).74 This section highlights the expansion of
the NFIP and subsidies, the bailouts that resulted from its financial
structure, the mandates that resulted from lack of demand for the
product, and the mapping of flood-prone areas.
1.

Community Participation

The framework of the NFIP made flood insurance available to those
communities that adopted land use codes and floodplain management
strategies that were acceptable to the federal government. By 2010,

70. See
Standard
Flood
Insurance
Policy
Forms,
FEMA.GOV,
http://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program/standard-flood-insurance-policyforms (last visited Feb. 16, 2014); INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13. They
do not cover damage to finished basements. Id. The First Circuit Court of Appeals has
decided that a bank can require flood insurance for the full value of the house, not just the
remaining amount due on the mortgage. Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 738
F.3d 432, 446 (1st Cir. 2013).
71. GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
72. INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13; see Scales, supra note 3, at 14.
73. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 84–85; GAO, 2010
CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 7; GAO, 2008 FEMA’S RATESETTING PROCESS REPORT, supra note 65, at 11–18.
74. Scales, supra note 3, at 13–14.
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participating communities covered virtually all inhabited areas subject to
floods.75 Roughly 22,000 communities had taken the steps necessary to
participate.76
2.

Expanded Subsidies

Congress, as noted above,77 required subsidized rates for old
houses—those built before 1974 or before a flood insurance rate map
was published.78 FEMA, in administering the NFIP, later instituted a
second type of subsidy known as “grandfathering.”
These
grandfathering subsidies applied in two circumstances.79 First, when
flood risk maps changed so that a house which had been in a low risk
zone was remapped into a high risk zone, the initial lower rate still
applied to the house.80 Second, when a policyholder in a high risk zone
built a house in compliance with flood maps, she could keep rates that
reflected that compliance, even if a later map showed yet more risk and
would have resulted in a higher premium without the subsidy.81 FEMA
introduced these additional subsidies, according to the GAO, “because of
external pressures to reduce the effects of rate increases, considerations
of equity, ease of administration, and promoting management.”82
Overall, the highest risk properties received the biggest subsidies.83
Congress and FEMA adopted the two types of subsidies to
encourage participation, increase administrative ease, and promote an
undefined concept of fairness. “[E]xternal pressures,” perhaps more
accurately defined as “political pressures,” to keep rates down, also
played a role in Congress’s adoption of the subsidies.
75. Apparently the few flood-prone areas that did not participate either had few
structures or only small areas of serious flood risk. If a person lived outside a high-risk
area she could still purchase flood insurance. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 8.
76. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 4. As of
July 2013, the 22,000 figure was still used. GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT,
supra note 3, at 5.
77. See supra Part I.A.4.
78. See supra Part I.A.4.
79. See supra Part I.A.4.
80. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 7, 14. This
is the type of subsidy most commonly referred to as “grandfathering” in this context. The
“old house” subsidies are sometimes referred to as grandfathered also.
81. Implementation of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012: One
Year After Enactment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Policy of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013), 2013 WLNR 23334770
[hereinafter FEMA Administrator 2013 Written Testimony] (written testimony of Craig
Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency) (explaining types of
subsidies).
82. GAO, 2011 PUBLIC POLICY GOALS REPORT, supra note 26, at 4; Scales, supra
note 3, at 15.
83. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 7, 14.
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The same number of properties—roughly one million—remained
subsidized from the start of the program until 2012. These subsidized
policies made up a smaller proportion of the total number of flood
policies as the total number of flood insurance policies increased. 84
There are currently about 5.5 million flood policies in the United States;
about one-fifth of these policies had subsidized rates immediately prior
to the flood insurance reforms of 2012.85 Many of these subsidized
policies insured properties that suffer repetitive flood losses. In 2010,
the GAO estimated that the repetitive loss policies comprise only one
percent of policies, but they “account for 25% to 30% of claims.”86 The
supposedly non-subsidized, or full-risk policies (the remaining four-fifths
of the policies) also do not reflect the actual risk of flooding; it is fair to
say that all the NFIP policies were subsidized prior to the passage of the
2012 reforms.87 About 70 percent of flood policies are located in five
states: Florida, Texas, California, Louisiana, and New Jersey; Florida’s
policies alone comprise about 40 percent of the total.88
3.

Repeated Bailouts

The flood insurance subsidies meant that the NFIP would not
always be able to support itself. In fact, it was designed to run a deficit
in years with large flood losses.89 As the GAO has stated, the NFIP was
“not designed to be actuarially sound.”90 The NFIP’s financial structure
has not allowed it to build up a reserve fund, and it has had to borrow

84.
85.

Originally 70% of the policies had been subsidized. Scales, supra note 3, at 16.
FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7; GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES
REPORT, supra note 3, at 6. The actual number is closer to 1,153,000. Id. at 31–32. As of
December 31, 2013, the precise number was 5,497,151. Policy Statistics, BUREAUNET,
http://bsa.nfipstat.fema.gov/reports/1011.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). Florida had
2,037,707 policies as of that date. Id.
86. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 7, 14.
87. Id. at 5–7. In this article, the term “subsidies” generally refers to the explicit
general subsidies for older home and grandfathered properties. See Parts I.A.4, I.B.2.
88. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 112–13; Policy Statistics,
supra note 85.
89. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 111–12. As of May, 2013,
FEMA owed the Treasury Department $24 billion. GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES
REPORT, supra note 3, at 2. This was never expected to be fully paid back. Id.
90. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 5-6. For a
program to be “actuarially sound,” the total premiums collected should more than offset
the total claims paid out. Sunset provisions have always been part of the law, and
Congress has even let the program lapse at times. See generally, e.g., Christina Equi,
Oops, They Did It Again. Because of Congress, There is No Flood Insurance Available!
What is a Lender to Do?, METAVANTE REGULATORY SERVICES: HOT ISSUE (Metavante
Corp., Milwaukee, Wis.), Apr. 1, 2010, 2010 WL 1641007.
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from the Treasury Department when premiums do not cover losses.91
The NFIP has had staggering deficits at times, especially in recent
years.92
4.

Purchase Mandates in High-Risk Zones

Purchase of flood insurance was initially voluntary; legislators
assumed that homeowners in areas at high risk of flood would want to
buy the insurance, particularly in light of the generous subsidies.
However, demand was unexpectedly low. Congress then added the
requirement that, whenever any federally regulated bank has a mortgage
in a high-risk flood zone, flood insurance must be on the property
throughout the life of the loan.93 Borrowers must buy the insurance, and
lenders must make sure that they do.94 By contrast, when a house in a
high-risk zone has no mortgage, there is no flood insurance purchase
requirement.95 No purchase mandate exists for properties outside highrisk zones.96
5.

Mapping and Rate-Setting

The NFIP developed flood maps for the entire nation, as set out in
the Flood Act. However, this was a difficult and expensive project for
which Congress did not provide sufficient money.97 The NFIP set flood
insurance rates as was required.98
6.

Sale by Private Companies: The “Write-Your-Own” Program

Because of weak demand even for discounted flood policies,99
Congress made reforms to encourage private companies to sell the

91. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 112–13; Scales, supra note 3,
at 16–17.
92. GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 1–2.
93. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 86. This requirement was put
into place in 1973 and expanded in 1994. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED
REPORT, supra note 59, at 4; INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13.
94. INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13. This requirement, often
known as the “lenders’ mandate,” effectively applies to all properties that are mortgaged.
Scales, supra note 3, at 18.
95. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 13–16.
96. Id. at 13–16.
97. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 159–63 (1985–1986).
98. See generally GAO, 2008 FEMA’S RATE-SETTING PROCESS REPORT, supra note
65.
99. See LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND CORP., THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM’S MARKET PENETRATION RATE, at xix, 1 (2006), available at
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insurance based on the idea that private companies are better than the
government at selling insurance. The flood insurance provided through
the NFIP has gone through different iterations, but in 1983, the NFIP
became a public-private partnership in which the NFIP acted as the
actual underwriter while private insurers, such as homeowners insurance
companies, generally sold the policies, receiving sales commissions and
compensation for loss-adjustment expenses.100
7.

Floodplain Management and Flood Mitigation

One of the NFIP’s goals was to improve floodplain management
and mitigation so that losses from floods would be reduced.101 The
Flood Act gave the Secretary of the HUD the authority to set minimum
criteria for zoning in floodplains.102 The NFIP’s broad framework, as
outlined earlier, required communities that wanted residents to be able to
buy flood insurance to pass ordinances satisfying criteria set by the
program. When communities passed such ordinances, they became
eligible for grants to reduce flood losses, and then residents of those
communities could purchase flood insurance.
FEMA has worked to help homeowners and communities mitigate
properties by supporting improvements aimed to reduce flood damage,
such as demolition, relocation, and elevation. 30,000 properties were
mitigated using FEMA funds between 1997 and 2007.103 Building codes
aimed at reducing flood risk play an important role in flood mitigation;
for example, certain codes require new construction in a high risk area to
conform to elevation requirements which will likely reduce flood
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR300.pdf;
see infra Part II.B.2 (describing limited demand for flood insurance and reasons).
100. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 85; Scales, supra note 3, at 14.
This is known as the “Write-Your-Own” (“WYO”) program, although it seems to be a
misnomer because the policies are written by the NFIP. Scales, supra note 3, at 14. The
companies collect premiums, enroll policyholders, and administer claims. Id.; see 42
U.S.C. § 4071(a)(1) (2012). Private companies, selling federal policies, are referred to as
“fiscal agents” of the federal government. See 42 U.S.C. § 4071(a)(1) (2012).
101. “Mitigation” is defined in this context as risk reduction measures such as storm
shutters and the use of flood-resistant building material. KUNREUTHER & MICHELKERJAN, supra note 3, at 249–50. Mitigation measures can significantly reduce the costs
of repairs. Id. at 250–51. The 1968 federal legislation stated:
It is the further purpose of this chapter to (1) encourage state and local
governments to make appropriate land use adjustments to constrain the
development of land which is exposed to flood damage and minimize damage
caused by flood losses, (2) guide the development of proposed future
construction, where practicable, away from locations which are threatened by
flood hazards . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 4001(e) (2012).
102. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 8–11; Houck, supra note 97, at 69.
103. GAO, 2011 PUBLIC POLICY GOALS REPORT, supra note 26, at 6.

WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

382

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

1/15/2015 3:26 PM

[Vol. 119:2

damage.104 Existing buildings in flood zones, on the other hand, are
treated very differently. They do not need to be updated to be in
compliance with current building codes unless they are being repaired or
reconstructed and the work is worth more than 50 percent of the market
value.105 In addition to supporting mitigation, a large part of federal
floodplain management has consisted of levee construction and
maintenance.106
8.

Relationship to Federal Disaster Relief

One of the goals of the NFIP was to reduce disaster relief costs.107
Federal disaster relief is activated by a federal declaration of an area as a
disaster area under the Stafford Act.108 Immediate rescue efforts are part
of disaster relief, but disaster relief also includes housing assistance.109
The line between disaster housing assistance provided by FEMA
and benefits supplied by individually purchased flood insurance coverage
is not always clear. FEMA states that its disaster housing assistance “is
not intended to restore your damaged property to its condition before the
disaster.”110 FEMA lists the following under “housing needs/temporary
housing”: “financial assistance may be available to the homeowner to
repair damage from the disaster to their primary residence that is not
covered by insurance. The goal is to make the damaged home safe,
sanitary, and functional.”111 Flood insurance must be used before relief
104. INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13.
105. Id.; see 44 C.F.R. §§ 51.1, 60.3(c)(2). This regulation creates incentives to not
engage in expensive renovations but to keep renovations limited so as not to be required
to rebuild to code. It encourages not renovating or breaking up large renovation projects
into small projects so as not to pass the 50% threshold. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., AM.
INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM:
FINAL REPORT 42 (2006), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/20130726-1602-20490-1463/nfip_eval_final_report.pdf.
106. See NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., Levee Report, supra note 30; THE NATION’S RESPONSES,
supra note 16; Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3. Levees are structures built to hold
back water so that people can live nearby. Levees both reduce and increase risk—they
reduce it by holding back the water, but they also increase it by creating the impression
that they are totally safe. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3; see NAT’L ACAD. SCIS.,
Levee Report, supra note 30; THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012).
108. Lake, supra note 24, at 95.
109. Disaster
Assistance
Available
from
FEMA,
FEMA.GOV,
http://www.fema.gov/disaster-assistance-available-fema, (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
110. What is Disaster Assistance?, FEMA.GOV, http://www.fema.gov/what-disasterassistance (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
111. There is similar language that “[f]inancial assistance may be available to
homeowners to replace their home destroyed in the disaster that is not covered by
insurance.” Disaster Assistance Available from FEMA, supra note 109. FEMA notes
that the grants are funded by taxpayers and have a limit. What Specific Items are
Covered by “Housing Assistance”?, FEMA.GOV, http://www.fema.gov/apply-
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may be received, according to the FEMA website.112 FEMA also
provides rebuilding and other loans for people in flood-damaged areas.113
Further, FEMA supplies temporary housing assistance, which flood
insurance does not.114 Although FEMA tries to sharply distinguish
between flood insurance and disaster relief, there is some overlap.115
9.

The NFIP in 2012

By 2012 the NFIP had developed into a multifaceted program that
had mapped the country for flood risk and had the participation of almost
all flood-prone communities across the country. There were about 5.5
million flood policies and about one-fifth were heavily subsidized. Deep
subsidies and huge storms had led to significant deficits. Because of low
demand, mortgage holders in flood-prone areas were required to keep
flood insurance in place. Private companies sold policies to increase
demand, though the U.S. government shouldered all the risk. Floodplain
management included grants for mitigating properties so they were more
resistant to floods, zoning laws requiring elevation of new structures but
not older structures, and levee construction and maintenance. Federal
disaster relief included both rescue efforts and housing assistance, some
of which overlapped with flood insurance benefits. Although the NFIP
was ambitious, its impossible goals would eventually lead to reform.

assistance/what-specific-items-are-covered-housing-assistance (last visited Oct. 15,
2014). Repair assistance may cover structural parts of the home such as foundation,
outside walls, roof, windows, floors, walls, ceilings, septic, or sewage system. Id. It may
also cover well or water system, heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system,
utilities, anchoring and blocking a mobile home, and other elements. Id.
112. The website specifies that these grants cannot be given if someone has insurance
to cover them. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. These grants seem to cover
much of what would otherwise be covered by insurance. FEMA’s literature urges people
at risk to buy insurance because it puts you “in control” while disaster relief is uncertain.
See infra notes 184–87 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 220.
113. Disaster Assistance Available from FEMA, supra note 109.
114. DIXON ET AL., supra note 99, at 53–54.
115. See infra notes 183–86 and accompanying text. Reflecting this problem of the
relationship between flood insurance and disaster relief, some homeowners whose houses
were damaged by Superstorm Sandy wished that they did not have flood insurance and
could instead have relied solely on disaster relief. Alan Krawitz, After Flood Insurance
Problems Persist, Some in South Queens, Rockaway Say They Feel They Would Have
Fared
Better
Without
It,
FORUM
NEWSGROUP
(Jan.
9,
2014),
http://theforumnewsgroup.com/2014/01/09/after-flood-insurance-problems-persist-somein-south-queens-rockaway-say-they-feel-they-would-have-fared-better-without-it/.

WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

384

II.

1/15/2015 3:26 PM

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119:2

FEDERAL FLOOD INSURANCE POLICY: ASSESSMENT OF THE
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM PRIOR TO THE 2012 AND
2014 REFORMS

This section discusses the NFIP’s progress towards its goals,
reviews its impacts, and summarizes criticisms of it. Before focusing on
the negatives and criticisms, it is important to note the NFIP’s
successes.116 It has made flood insurance widely available, both within
and outside flood zones.117 Approximately $1 billion annually in flood
losses are avoided because of mitigation and floodplain management
measures.118 The NFIP has mitigated thousands of buildings so they will
be more resistant to flood damage going forward.119 Most new buildings
in flood zones are built according to NFIP standards and are more
resistant to flood damage than they would be otherwise.120 But
Congress, in establishing and continuing the NFIP, set itself impossible
challenges and created incentives which are increasingly problematic
given climate change risk.
A.

The National Flood Insurance Program’s Conflicting and
Unattainable Goals

The goals of the NFIP were in conflict and exceedingly unlikely to
be met even in the best of circumstances and even in the absence of
climate change. The NFIP, as noted above, had three main goals: first,
providing insurance to people in flood-prone areas who could not
otherwise get it on “reasonable terms and conditions;”121 second,
reducing disaster relief costs;122 and third, improving floodplain
management so that disaster relief costs are reduced.123 The aim of
providing flood insurance on reasonable terms and conditions conflicts
with the aim of saving federal money expressed in the second and third
goals. This conflict becomes apparent when one analyzes the goal of
supplying insurance on “reasonable terms and conditions” for people in

116. See infra note 117.
117. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 8. In highrisk zones it is estimated that roughly 50% of homes have flood insurance. DIXON ET AL.,
supra note 99, at xvi.
118. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at 8–9; CAMILO SARMIENTO & TED R.
MILLER, AM. INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF FLOODING AND THE
IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM at ix (2006).
119. GAO, 2011 PUBLIC POLICY GOALS REPORT, supra note 26, at 6.
120. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at xi.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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flood-prone areas who could not otherwise obtain insurance.124 If
“reasonable terms” means “affordable” and the insurance is affordable
because it does not reflect the actual flood risk, as is the case with the
NFIP, then the premiums will not cover the losses sustained.
Consequently, the NFIP will lose money. Having a government
insurance program with premiums that are lower than they would be if
they reflected actual flood risk is a solidaristic approach to flood risk. 125
Flood risk is a very difficult risk to insure, as the next section explains.126
“Affordable flood insurance” is almost a contradiction in terms for older
houses in high-risk areas if we think of “insurance” rates as being based
on individual risk. The government losing money on the insurance
aspect of the program, then, is a predictable part of providing affordable
insurance for people in flood-prone areas.
Moreover, the general aim of saving federal money, as expressed in
the second and third goals of reducing disaster relief costs and improving
floodplain management, was very unlikely to succeed. Congress
presumed that the federal government would not have to pay as much for
disaster assistance if there were enforced rules in flood-prone areas
requiring safer construction and if people bought insurance for flood
damage.127 This plan made theoretical sense, but there have been at least
three major problems in practice. First, if below-market insurance is
available and federal management such as levee construction encourages
people to move to and feel safe in flood-prone areas, more property, not
less, will be at risk of flood damage. Furthermore, supplying cheap
insurance for older buildings may discourage replacing or renovating
them to improve their flood resistance.128 Higher disaster-relief costs
may result.129 Second, the program had no practical way to compel safer
construction in flood-prone areas, again resulting in more at-risk
property.130 And third, one of the enduring problems with flood
insurance is lack of demand resulting in many losses remaining
uninsured.131 Ironically, the goal of saving federal money through
improved floodplain management practices leading to less at-risk
property was undermined by the very fact of offering below-market
insurance in high-risk areas, as well as by the lack of enforcement of
land-use regulations that might reduce flood damage. Before 2012, the
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
See O’NEILL & O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 6–7.
See infra Part II.B.
See generally supra Part I.A.4; FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105;
SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 118.
128. SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 118, at x.
129. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 262–63.
130. See supra Part I.A.4, I.B.7.
131. See supra Part I.B.4; infra Parts II.B.2, III.A.1.d.
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program did not support the goals related to saving the federal
government money, though it did make flood insurance widely available
at low prices. The general goal of a unified floodplain management
policy also remained distant.132
B.

The Difficulty of Insuring Flood Risk at an Inexpensive Price

The aim of insuring flood losses faces inherent challenges. In a
way, this is obvious because if flood risk was easy to insure, there would
be insurance available for it. But to understand the NFIP’s challenges, it
is important to understand the issues from an insurance perspective. A
number of factors on both the supply side and the demand side help
explain why floods are difficult to insure privately. This explains in part
how the United States set itself an impossible task by aiming to provide
flood insurance to homeowners on “reasonable terms and conditions.”
Few bother to consider why private insurers have declined to offer basic
homeowners coverage for floods for the past 50 years. For example, one
op-ed writer criticizing the 2012 reforms states that the NFIP had
“cornered the market” for flood insurance, as if it were a desirable risk
that the federal government had stolen from the private market rather
than a difficult and unprepossessing risk the federal government began to
cover in the absence of private market coverage.133
1.

Supply Side

a.

Correlated and Ambiguous Risk

Floods and other natural disasters cause correlated losses.134 The
losses from these events are likely to be massive, close in time, and
centered upon one geographical area. Insurance works by diversifying
risk; correlated risk is the opposite.135 The presence of correlated risks
makes insurance companies reluctant or unwilling to sell insurance.136

132. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c) (2012).
133. John Romano, From Top to Bottom, FEMA Has Botched Handling Flood
Insurance Rates, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 7, 2014, 10:06 PM),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/from-top-to-bottom-fema-has-botched-handlingflood-insurance-rates/2164725.
134. See supra text accompanying note 29; Scales, supra note 3, at 10–11; Luke &
Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 23–24.
135. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 5.
136. Indeed, natural disasters, even with the various exclusions in private insurance
policies, have seriously strained private insurers. See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 3, at
14–15; FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 47–49 (2013).
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In addition, the probability and extent of natural disasters is difficult
to predict, particularly with climate change.137 When risks are
ambiguous, pricing insurance is troublesome, and insurance tends to be
extremely expensive to account for the ambiguity of the risk. Thus, it
may be priced too high for customers to be willing to buy it.138
b.

Adverse Selection

Adverse selection is the tendency of higher-risk individuals to be
more inclined to purchase insurance than lower-risk individuals.139 In
theory, adverse selection leads to a pool containing more higher-risk
members than insurance companies anticipate, which leads to more
claims than predicted, higher prices, and eventual market failure.140
Some have questioned the actual influence of adverse selection in
insurance markets.141 Classically, the concept has been applied to health
and life insurance in which the insured may have access to better
information about his or her risks than the insurance company, and it is
typically referred to as an “information problem” for that reason.142
Adverse selection is viewed by the insurance industry as having been an
important deterrent to providing private flood insurance.143
In the case of flood insurance, where rates are based on maps setting
out flood zones that are available to both the insured and the insurer, that
classic information-imbalance issue is less persuasive than in other
contexts.144 But individuals still have much more information about their
individual properties than companies writing insurance for the NFIP, so
adverse selection may nonetheless still have effects on the willingness of
insurance companies to provide flood insurance.145

137. See sources cited supra notes 15, 21; KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra
note 3, at 132–133.
138. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 134–135.
139. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 5, at 6 –7.
140. Scales, supra note 3, at 8–9.
141. See generally, e.g., Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets:
An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).
142. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 25.
143. Scales, supra note 3, at 9.
144. Id.
145. While flood insurance is required for lending in flood hazard zones, this
requirement has been lightly enforced particularly after the closing. Luke &
Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 14–16. Individuals often let their flood policies lapse after
closing. Id. Banks often sell the first mortgage on a property to another bank which does
not enforce the requirement. INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13; see supra
Part I.B.; see infra Part III.A.1.d. For those individuals that keep their policies in force, it
is possible that their decisions reflect having information about their properties’ particular
vulnerabilities that makes them riskier to insure than the rest of the risk pool. That would
be adverse selection currently at work.
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Private insurance uses several methods to try to counter adverse
selection. Part of underwriting, in the absence of regulation, is that
private insurance companies may choose not to insure people who they
think are high risk, they may charge high-risk people more, or they may
choose not to renew policies which they believe carry too much risk.146
The NFIP has not been allowed to decline flood insurance to properties
that are high risk, and there have been strict statutory limits on rate
increases.147 Thus, the NFIP is vulnerable to adverse selection.148
c.

Moral Hazard

Moral hazard is the idea that, if an individual is insured for a loss,
she will take fewer precautions to avoid it, and, collectively, losses will
be greater than if there was no insurance for the losses.149 It also applies
beyond the insurance context to the theory that any sort of cost-shifting,
including post-disaster assistance, decreases individuals’ loss-avoiding
behavior.150 Insurance companies try to control moral hazard through
mechanisms such as co-pays and deductibles so that individuals will
exercise the same level of care that they would without insurance.151
The way moral hazard comes into play in the context of flood
insurance is that insurance available at a subsidized, affordable price for
homes in a high-risk area may increase the willingness of people to live
in flood-prone areas and if they do, to not take adequate precautions for
their property.152 As noted earlier, roughly one percent of the properties
insured by the NFIP have accounted for almost a third of the losses.153
Disaster relief may have moral hazard effects when people in floodprone areas, knowing that the federal government provides disaster
relief, decide not to buy flood insurance or let policies lapse when they
do.154 The idea that flood insurance and disaster assistance increases
146. ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 45–50.
147. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 5–6.
148. Also, as noted above, it charges the highest risk properties (the oldest properties
built without flood risk in mind) the lowest rates. See supra Part I.A.4.
149. BAKER, supra note 5, at 4–5.
150. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 27. The extent, meaning, and significance
of moral hazard has been brilliantly questioned in Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of
Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
151. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 27–28; BAKER, supra note 5, at 4–5.
152. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 28.
153. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 10.
154. See Trebilcock & Daniels, supra note 33, at 104 (asserting that “ex post disaster
relief . . . has all kinds of perverse incentive effects, severely exacerbating problems of
adverse selection . . . in locational decisions by enabling residents of disaster-prone areas
to externalize a large fraction of the cost of their locational decisions onto other[s] . . . ”);
ERWIN O. MICHEL-KERJAN, HAVE WE ENTERED AN EVER-GROWING CYCLE ON
GOVERNMENT
DISASTER
RELIEF?
(2013),
available
at
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people’s willingness to live in flood-prone areas is accepted by many
scholars155 but not all.156 Floodplain-management zoning regulations are
aimed at controlling moral hazard because they try to decrease the costs
of flood loss and compel people to exercise more care when rebuilding,
for example, by requiring that new structures be elevated.157 However,
these codes are often under-enforced in high-hazard areas.158
Government actions such as levee construction and defining areas
as floodplains may encourage people to think that they live in safe areas
and therefore to not buy flood insurance or invest in protective
measures, even if they can afford them.159 Many floods happen outside
high-risk flood zones, and the designation of such zones may suggest to
people who live outside the zones that their homes will be safe from
floods, even if they are close to water.160
d.

Information and Mapping

Information about precise flood risk is difficult and expensive to
develop. FEMA has prepared flood maps for the United States, but
many are outdated.161 Mapping technology has rapidly advanced,
however, so that it may no longer be quite so difficult to develop
adequate maps.162 Because risk analysis has become much more
sophisticated, FEMA should be able to develop very finely tuned risk
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/US-Senate-Small-BusinessCte_2013Mar14_MichelKerjan.pdf.
155. See, e.g., Raymond Burby, Flood Insurance and Floodplain Management: The
U.S. Experience, 3 ENVTL. HAZARDS 111 (2001); Blake Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use
Federalism to Address Transitory and Perpetual Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism
Framework, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1991, 2003–04 (2011); Marc Poirier, A Very Clear Blue
Line: Behavioral Economics, Public Choice, Public Art, and Sea Level Rise, 16 S.E.
ENVTL. L.J. 83, 92 (2007); Dan Tarlock, U.S. Flood Control Policy, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 151 n.198 (2012); Trebilcock & Daniels, supra note 33, at 104.
156. See, e.g., KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 122 (finding that
most homeowners in hurricane-prone areas do not expect to get federal assistance
following a disaster).
157. Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 30.
158. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 17.
159. See DIXON ET AL., supra note 99, at xvi (noting that the market penetration rate
of the NFIP outside of specified flood hazard zones is 1%); NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., Levee
Report, supra note 30 (observing that areas behind levees are not risk free). Detailed
discussion of issues involving levee construction and maintenance are beyond the scope
of this article.
160. FEMA notes that people who live outside of flood zones file nearly 25% of NFIP
claims and receive one third of disaster assistance for flooding. Resources: Flood Facts,
FLOODSMART.GOV, https://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/flood_facts.jsp (last
visited Feb. 16, 2014).
161. Hornstein, supra note 3, at 33–34; GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS REPORT,
supra note 59, at 8–9.
162. See Owen, supra note 30.
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analyses, given sufficient resources.163 Accurate maps would allow
private companies to make informed decisions about risk and only offer
insurance if the risk analysis makes sense.164 But given the current
outdated and inaccurate maps, private companies are unlikely to rush to
take on flood risk.165
All these factors—correlated and ambiguous risk, adverse selection,
moral hazard, and information—affect the supply of flood insurance,
help explain why it is such a difficult risk to insure, and contribute to
understanding the challenge the United States has set for itself.
2.

Demand Side: Cognitive Biases and Disaster Relief

Flood insurance is not a product that people eagerly buy. As
discussed above, flood insurance is heavily subsidized—by more than 50
percent for the riskiest properties—and it is therefore an excellent
bargain.166 Yet, homeowners, even in flood-prone areas, tend not to
purchase it voluntarily and tend to let their policies lapse after a few
years.167 Homeowners outside flood zones are even less likely to buy
it.168 State insurance commissioners’ and FEMA’s repeated messages to
homeowners urging them to buy flood insurance go unheeded.169
Enforcement of the lenders’ mandate has been limited at best.170
The tepid demand has been behind many of the changes in the
NFIP.171 To its credit, the NFIP in recent years has increased the number
163. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., Levee Report, supra note 30. This finely grained analysis
may allow ever more specific flood zones, thus reducing the degree of risk-sharing across
policyholders, an important point that deserves future consideration. O’NEILL &
O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 8.
164. GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4, at 10–11
(2014).
165. Id.
166. See supra Parts I.A.4, II.B.2; Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 32–42.
167. INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 29, at 41, 48; DIXON ET
AL., supra note 99, at 25 (stating that within flood zones, approximately 20% of
properties that are not covered by the mandatory purchase requirement—i.e., properties
without mortgages—have flood insurance).
168. DIXON ET AL., supra note 99, at xvi (noting that market penetration of flood
insurance outside flood zones is 1%).
169. See, e.g., Press Release, Md. Ins. Admin., Prepare for Hurricane Season Now
(May 22, 2013), available at www.mdinsurance.state.md.us/sa/news-center/prepare-forhurricane-season-now.html; Brochure, FEMA, Why You Need Flood Insurance (Feb. 1,
2014), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/4304.
170. INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13 (noting that enforcement of this
requirement is weak because the first mortgage on property is often sold to another bank).
Given that banks usually sell mortgages and that homeowners do generally maintain
property insurance on their homes, it is not clear why the fact that mortgages are sold
would have particular impact in this context. However, institutions are as subject to the
biases discussed here as individuals. Scales, supra note 3, at 18.
171. According to a 2006 Rand Corporation Study:
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of policies substantially.172 However, the still low demand contributes to
the risk of insolvency for the program because there are too few
policyholders to contribute premiums so the policies can pay for
losses.173
Various factors contribute to low demand for flood insurance. One
such factor is various cognitive biases behavioral economists have
studied in recent years. For example, it is widely known that
“individuals routinely underestimate the magnitude of low-probability,
high-loss events”174 and so under-prepare for them. Many people
consider flooding a remote risk that is not worth insuring. At the same
time, many overpay for events that seem more familiar and salient, such
as warranties for appliances.175 The failure to plan for risks that seem
remote is not limited to individuals but applies to governments as well.176
Often, people have an optimism bias, so that even if they understand
the flood risk, they convince themselves that the negative event will not
occur.177 When people have a flood policy for a few years and have not
made a claim under it, they often let it lapse, sometimes viewing the
policy as a “poor investment”178 and assuming that because nothing bad
has happened, nothing bad will happen. Procrastination is also a
potential contributor. No one wants to think about a potential disaster,
and it is often easier to postpone costs for such a low-probability,
catastrophic event than to incur them.179
The reluctance of homeowners to purchase flood insurance has been an
ongoing problem for the NFIP and was the primary reason for adoption of the
mandatory purchase requirement. The low rate among homes that are not
subject to the mandatory purchase requirement suggests that little has changed
over the years and points to the importance of the mandatory purchase
requirement in maintaining the market penetration rates that are observed
today.
DIXON ET AL., supra note 99, at xxi.
172. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 8.
173. As the GAO noted in adding the NFIP to its high-risk program, “[t]he extent of
participation in the program may also contribute to its financial insolvency. Specifically,
the level of noncompliance with current mandatory purchase requirement by affected
property owners is unknown and voluntary participation in the program is limited.”
GAO, 2006 FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH-RISK REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
174. Scales, supra note 3, at 9; see INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra
note 29, at 71–72, 113–115; KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 16.
175. INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 29, at 130–132.
176. Scales, supra note 3, at 12. See generally KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN,
supra note 3 (suggesting ways for governments to be more proactive).
177. Robert J. Meyer, Why We Under-Prepare for Hazards, in ON RISK AND
DISASTER, supra note 3, at 160.
178. INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 29, at 103.
179.
Robert Meyer writes that “[d]ecisions to invest in protection against lowprobability events are particularly susceptible to procrastination.” Meyer, supra note
177, at 164. The decision to pay for insurance gets pushed into the future until at some
point it really is too late. Flood insurance has a 30-day waiting period before it becomes
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Another bias affecting the choice to purchase flood insurance is the
availability bias, or the tendency to plan for the future based on the
recent past or to make a decision based on the most easily accessible
information. While shortly after disasters like Hurricane Katrina, the risk
of floods seems salient and people buy flood insurance, in a few years,
memories fade and demand goes down.180
Also, people often
misunderstand terms like “100-year flood” which refers to a one percent
annual probability of a flood occurring in a particular area at a particular
height.181 But when an area has flooded, people tend to think they are
safe for the next 100 years.182
An additional possible reason people do not buy flood insurance is
that they think the federal government’s disaster relief will cover their
losses.183 In recent years, the expectation of disaster aid has affected
individuals’ decisions to purchase insurance.184 FEMA’s website shows
overlap between private insurance and disaster relief and specifies that
private insurance must be used first, which might influence some people
to not buy flood insurance.185 FEMA has tried to encourage people to
buy flood insurance by preparing videos that feature people who
benefited from flood insurance in recent hurricanes and writing
information sheets contrasting insurance with disaster aid.186 Insurance
is immediate and puts you more in control after a disaster, FEMA says.187
It is not clear how persuasive these efforts have been.
effective so that it will not be effective if purchased right before a storm. Resources:
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
FLOODSMART.GOV,
https://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/faqs/will-there-be-a-waiting-period-formy-policy-to-take-effect.jsp (last visited Oct., 15, 2014).
180. Scales, supra note 3, at 10; Meyer, supra note 177, at 159.
181. Scales, supra note 3, at 9; NAT’L ACAD. SCIS., Levee Report, supra note 30;
Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural Disaster
Insurance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER, supra note 3, at 199.
182. Scales, supra note 3, at 9. This commonly recognized phenomenon is known as
the “gambler’s fallacy.” Id.
183. INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 29, at 114; see supra Part
I.B.8 (describing disaster relief and overlap between disaster relief and private
insurance); infra Part II.E.
184. MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 154, at 3; INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS, supra note 29, at 114–15.
185. See supra Part I.B.8; infra Part II.E (discussing disaster relief and the overlap
between FEMA aid and flood insurance).
186. See, e.g., Mary’s Story: “I Was Able to Rebuild My Home”, FLOODSMART.GOV,
www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/videos/video_index.jsp (last visited Sept. 16,
2014); Brochure, FEMA, The Benefits of Flood Insurance Versus Disaster Assistance
(Nov. 1, 2012), available at www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1643-204909801/f_217_benefits_30nov2012_web.pdf [hereinafter FEMA, Comparison Information
Brochure].
187. See FEMA, Comparison Information Brochure, supra note 186 (“You are in
control. Flood insurance claims are paid even if a disaster is not declared by the
President.”).
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Some people have not taken advantage of the “bargain,” perhaps
because they have not realized that the insurance is subsidized.188
Similarly, some might think that the seemingly isolated and limited risk
of “flood” is just not worth spending money on, whereas if “flood” was
bundled with other risks, it might seem worthwhile to spend money on
it.189 Together with the other factors summarized above, it may not seem
like a bargain at all.190 Moreover, the increased risk of floods associated
with climate change may collide in some people’s minds with the denial
of climate change; thus, the increased risk of floods is denied along with
climate change.191
C.

Unintended Consequences: Development in Flood-Prone Areas
and Incentives to Not Renovate Older Homes

While one goal of the NFIP was to limit development in
floodplains, there is widespread agreement that the NFIP has contributed
to development in flood-prone areas and has created incentives for not
188. The premium rate sheet includes a summary that indicates whether the policy
receives a subsidy, but homeowners may not focus on this information. See Mary Ellen
Klas, Homeowners Should Do Their Homework When Reviewing Flood Insurance Rates,
MIAMI
HERALD
BLOG
(Oct.
5,
2013,
9:29
AM),
http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2013/10/homeowners-should-do-theirhomework-when-reviewing-flood-insurance-rates.html.
189. INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13 (describing bundling approach).
See generally Kunreuther, supra note 181; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO08–7, NATURAL DISASTERS: PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE FEDERAL ROLE
IN NATURAL CATASTROPHE INSURANCE (2007) [hereinafter GAO, 2007 NATURAL
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE REPORT].
190. Yet another contributor to the low demand may be the way flood insurance is
sold. Private companies sell most of it, although it can be obtained directly from the
NFIP. See INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13. As noted above, the federal
government retains all the underwriting risk. Id. (describing this approach as “unique”).
Private insurance companies receive a fixed commission for each policy sold and a
portion of the claims costs. Scales, supra note 3, at 14–15; KUNREUTHER & MICHELKERJAN, supra note 3, at 85–86. The idea behind this marketing structure was that
private insurance companies are much better at selling insurance than the government,
thus, having companies sell flood policies would increase participation in the program.
Scales, supra note 3, at 14–15. Because private companies were not selling flood
coverage anyway, this would not create conflicts for private companies. However, this
has not increased participation as much as was predicted for reasons that are not
altogether clear. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 85–86. The Rand
study on market penetration notes that one of the most predictive factors for whether
flood policies are sold is whether there are a lot of other flood policies sold in a particular
area. DIXON, ET AL., supra note 99, at 38. This suggests that insurance agents and
companies sell flood insurance only if they are familiar with it from other policies.
191. See generally Connie Roser-Renouf et al., Engaging Diverse Audiences with
Climate Change: Message Strategies For Global Warming’s Six Americas, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENT AND COMMUNICATION (Ander Hansen &
Robert Cox eds., forthcoming Mar. 2015) [hereinafter Engaging Diverse Audiences with
Climate Change].
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replacing older buildings in these areas.192 Rather than guiding
development away from flood-prone areas, the NFIP has encouraged
development in these areas and tried to make construction there safer.193
The federalist structure of the U.S. government contributes to this
result. Land-use planning is primarily a local and state issue.194 So,
although the NFIP offered subsidized insurance to communities that
passed acceptable floodplain regulations,195 it did not provide a way for
the federal government to make sure that communities enforced those
regulations.196 Building codes are often poorly enforced in flood-prone
areas.197 Local land-use regulators sometimes respond to pressure to
favor development to support economic growth.198 The threat of takings
litigation in opposition to land-use regulation has not subsided in recent
years.199 Emblematic of this structural issue, the number of properties
suffering repetitive flood losses has continued to increase.200

192. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at x, 9, 12–14 (estimating that $1
billion of damage from floods is prevented every year by the flood program, but that the
NFIP had not guided development away from floodplains and had created incentives for
building and not replacing older buildings in flood-prone areas); Scales, supra note 3, at
13; Houck, supra note 97, at 73, 160; William J. Siffin, Bureaucracy, Entrepreneurship,
and Natural Resources: Witless Policy and the Barrier Islands, 1 CATO J. 293, 296 (1981)
(describing how federal insurance encouraged building on Padre island in Texas). One
report finds that the NFIP has not stimulated development or increased flood losses since
its new construction rules require mitigation which reduces flood losses. SARMIENTO &
MILLER, supra note 118, at x. The report also finds that the subsidized rates for older
homes in flood-prone areas inflates their value and “essentially [provides] an incentive
against redevelopment.” Id.; see supra Part I.B.7.
193. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at xii, 12–16.
194. Scales, supra note 3, at 12; Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 8–11.
195. Scales, supra note 3, at 8. The 1973 amendments required that federal assistance
for construction projects in floodplain areas had to be backed by flood insurance. 42
U.S.C. § 4012(a) (2012). This was added when the 1968 Act was not resulting in
communities joining the program. Houck, supra note 97, at 71.
196. See supra Part I.A.4; Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 9; see, e.g., United
States v. Parish of St. Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116, 1127 (5th Cir. 1985) (limiting remedies of
the United States against Louisiana public and private defendants for violating their
obligations to adopt and enforce flood control measures thus leading to massive flood
damage).
197. See, e.g., KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 17; Klein & Zellmer,
supra note 66, at 1496–1498.
198. KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 17.
199. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property
Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 105–06 (2012); Klein & Zellmer, supra note 66, at
1513; Justin Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY L. Q. 131,
140–41; THE NATION’S RESPONSES, supra note 16, at 85; Kildow & Scorse, supra note
22.
200. GAO, 2011 PUBLIC POLICY GOALS REPORT, supra note 26, at 6 (reporting that the
number of repetitive loss properties rose from 76,202 in 1997 to 132,100 in March 2011).
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New construction in high-risk areas must conform to elevation
requirements as mentioned earlier,201 and most new buildings constructed
in flood zones meet these standards.202 Existing buildings, by contrast,
do not need to meet elevation or other requirements unless reconstruction
or repair work worth more than 50 percent of the market value is being
done on the property.203 This creates incentives to forego expensive
renovations so property owners are not required to rebuild to code.204
Because below-cost insurance is available for older homes relative to
their risk, many times insurance payouts supply funds for owners to
continue to occupy the same risky buildings.205 U.S. flood insurance has
created negative incentives to pay for flood mitigation upgrades.206
Furthermore, the subsidy to older homes has artificially inflated their
value and contributed to them not being replaced by newer, more floodresistant structures.207 When Congress created the NFIP in 1968, it
expected that old, flood-prone buildings would disappear from
floodplains within 25 years, but this not what has happened.208
Approximately 3.5 million older properties remain, with an extremely
low turnover rate.209 Moreover, federal programs have created levees
and taken other measures to make areas “safe” to build.210
Despite the legislative goal of guiding development away from
floodplains, the opposite has happened: development on floodplains has
been fostered and has flourished in part due to the NFIP and related
programs. Some of this development is more flood-resistant than it
would be without the NFIP, but local building codes are often lightly
enforced, leading to newly-constructed, at-risk property.
This
development has resulted in increasing amounts of property at risk,
higher costs for the NFIP, and higher disaster relief costs. In short,
although certainly not the only factor at work, the program has
contributed to more development in flood-prone areas and to the
retention, rather than the replacement, of older homes.
As a
consequence, more property is at risk of floods.

201. INS. INFO. INST., Flood Insurance, supra note 13.
202. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at xi, 16.
203. See 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 60.3(c)(2) (2014).
204. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at 23.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 118, at x.
208. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at 22.
209. Id. at 23.
210. See, e.g., Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 10–12; FRENCH WETMORE
AL., supra note 105, at 25–26; supra Parts I.A.4, I.B.7.

ET
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Problematic Mapping and a Confusing Structure

Technical issues have endured throughout the history of the NFIP.
In 1985, Oliver Houck observed that Congress had not wholeheartedly
committed to the NFIP and claimed that, for it to work well, it needed
sufficient resources for mapping, rate-setting, and enforcement.211
Mapping has been a chronic issue, as maps are often outdated and
inaccurate.212 According to the GAO, more attention to rate-setting
continues to be needed.213 Local pushback to map changes has often
been intense, sometimes resulting in map revisions.214 In addition,
FEMA has not kept track of grandfathered properties or other important
data.215
Moreover, the NFIP’s structure is far from intuitive or selfexplanatory. Because the insurance is sold by private companies, it
probably is not clear to many policyholders that the federal government
actually is insuring them. Public understanding of basic insurance
principles is often lacking.216 Further, it likely is not apparent to many
potential buyers why the federal government is the insurer in this
context; namely, that the basic coverage has not been available on the
private market.217 Because the insurance is provided by the federal
government, consumer-friendly state insurance law doctrines do not
apply.218
E.

The Situation in 2012

The effects of federal disaster relief on insurance purchase decisions
and other actions have not been fully explored.219 Given the publicity
around federal disaster relief and the overlap between federal disaster
housing assistance and benefits provided by flood insurance, it would not
be surprising if some homeowners in flood-prone areas decided not to
211. Houck, supra note 97, at 159–163.
212. GAO, 2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59, at 7;
KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 16; Hornstein, supra note 3, at 34.
213. GAO, 2008 FEMA’S RATE-SETTING PROCESS REPORT, supra note 65, at 30.
214. Id. at 16–17; Hornstein, supra note 3, at 25–26; Luke & Abramovsky, supra
note 3, at 9–10.
215. GAO, 2008 FEMA’S RATE-SETTING PROCESS REPORT, supra note 65, at 20;
GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 31–32.
216. See Americans Believe They’re Savvy About Insurance, but NAIC Insurance IQ
Tells Different Story, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONER’S (May 10, 2009),
http://www.naic.org/Releases/2009_docs/insurance_iq.htm (providing data indicating
that majority of respondents expressed confidence about their insurance knowledge, but
most received a failing score of 40% on a basic ten-question insurance IQ test).
217. See supra Part II.B.
218. Scales, supra note 3, at 33, 38.
219. See supra Part I.B.8.
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buy flood insurance, or let their policies lapse, because they assumed
federal disaster assistance would pay for their losses.220 Of those who
did purchase policies prior to 2012, over one million flood insurance
policies were heavily subsidized, and the other four million were priced
at rates that did not reflect flood risk, under the NFIP’s solidaristic goal
of providing flood insurance to those who could not otherwise acquire it.
But the NFIP, unsurprisingly, had not met the conflicting actuarial
goal of saving the federal government money. Rather than guiding
development away from floodplains, it had encouraged development
there and discouraged the replacement or renovation of older buildings.
Localities and states often did not enforce building codes that might
lessen flood damage, and the NFIP could do little about it. Thousands of
properties had been mitigated with FEMA funds, reducing flood
damages by an estimated $1 billion a year. But disaster relief costs,
rather than decreasing, had increased dramatically.
Expensive subsidies on high-risk properties and storms had led to
large deficits. Although deficits were anticipated when the program
started, the idea that the program should be self-supporting had long ago
taken hold as part of an increasingly popular market approach to
government.221 The NFIP had been on the GAO’s high-risk list since
2006. Flood risk mapping, the basis for determination of rates, was
inadequate.
The federal government in 1968 chose to insure a risk that is
extremely difficult to insure by offering a product that people have to be
forced to buy even when it is offered at a steep discount. Federal disaster
relief overlapped with flood insurance benefits. The overall assessment
of the NFIP was mixed at best, particularly given that more frequent and
destructive storms were predicted.
III. THE 2012 AND 2014 REFORMS
A.

The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012

The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act (“BW-12”), the
most significant revision to the NFIP in at least 20 years, was passed
with bipartisan support by a wide margin and signed by President Obama
in July 2012.222 It reflected an actuarial approach to flood insurance and
220. See supra Part I.B.8.
221. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
MARKETS 6–8, 11 (2012).
222. Hornstein, supra note 3, at 30; Andrew G. Simpson, Agents, Insurers Cheer
Congress OK of Flood Insurance Reform Bill, INS. J. (June 29, 2012),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/nahona/2012/06/29/253845.htm.
BW-12 was
part of a large transportation bill and was uncontroversial at the time of passage. Bruce
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was aimed at making the NFIP fiscally stable and self-supporting.223 It
gradually eliminated all subsidies and called for the creation of a reserve
fund so that, ideally, taxpayers would not be called on to periodically bail
out the NFIP.224 It expanded mapping funds and authorized funding of
the NFIP for the next five years.225
An alliance between
environmentalists concerned about climate change, insurance companies,
and market-oriented reformers who want a smaller federal government
contributed to the 2012 revisions.226
The 2012 flood insurance revisions arose from years of deliberation.
The GAO had raised concerns about the fiscal stability of the NFIP
almost from the beginning.227 Researchers studying the NFIP had long
been calling for the removal of subsidies so that landowners in floodprone areas would bear the costs of the risks they encountered and so that
a private market for flood insurance could develop.228 The law’s
orientation towards risk-based rates and market participation was part of
the broad move towards markets in public policy over the past few
decades.229 Various GAO reports contain many of the recommendations
that became part of BW-12; furthermore, legislation similar to BW-12
had been introduced and even passed the House earlier.230 This section
outlines the most important aspects of BW-12.

Alpert, How Controversial Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Bill Became Law, TIMESPICAYUNE
(Aug.
13,
2013,
5:14
PM),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/08/how_controversial_biggert-wate.html.
223. FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7.
224. NAIC Overview, supra note 7.
225. Id.
226. Eli Lehrer, Strange Bedfellows: Smartersafer.org and the Biggert-Waters Act of
2012, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 351, 352 (2013) (describing coalition).
227. See GAO, 2006 FLOOD INSURANCE HIGH-RISK REPORT, supra note 7, at 5–6
(stating that GAO has raised concerns for 15 years).
228. See, e.g., Kunreuther, supra note 181, at 184, 191, 198; KUNREUTHER & MICHELKERJAN, supra note 3, at 193–203. For years there has been some private insurance
available for floods above the NFIP limits. Id. at 371 n.21, 373 n.26; see infra Part
IV.B.3.
229. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 221, at 7–8, 11.
230. See generally, e.g., GAO, 2011 ACTION NEEDED REPORT, supra note 68; GAO
2010 CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED REPORT, supra note 59; GAO, 2008 FEMA’S RATESETTING PROCESS REPORT, supra note 65. Prior bills included Flood Insurance Reform
and Modernization Act of 2006, H.R. 4973,109th Cong. (as passed by House, June 27,
2006); Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization Act of 2006, S. 3589,109th Cong. (as
introduced by Sen. Richard Shelby, June 28, 2006).
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Eventual Subsidy Elimination, Risk-Based Rates, and an
Actuarial Approach
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The 2012 reforms required that all subsidies eventually would be
phased out. As noted above, there were about one million subsidized
policies when these reforms passed.231 The most immediate subsidy
phase-outs were those for second homes, businesses, and severe
repetitive loss properties.232 The 2012 reforms phased out those
subsidies starting January 1, 2013, with rates rising 25 percent a year
until they reflected full-risk pricing.233 Subsidized rates for older homes
(pre-FIRM properties) that were primary residences would stay in effect
until the property was sold.234 A “sale trigger” provision required that
risk-based rates would be applied to these older homes once they were
sold.235 BW-12 also would have eventually eliminated subsidies for
houses that received subsidies based on mapping changes, known as
grandfathered properties.236

231. GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 1.
232. FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7. Policy holders who had subsidized
policies for non-primary residences, businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties (a
total of 5% of flood policyholders) received 25% premium increases starting January 1,
2013. Id. BW-12 eliminated subsidies for 438,000 policyholders, for second homes,
businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties as of January 1, 2013. GAO, 2013
SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 12. But 715,000 subsidized properties
remained. Id. “Severe repetitive loss” properties are defined as single family residences
which have suffered flood damage for which four or more claims have been made, each
greater than $5000 or at least two claims have been made with the total amount
exceeding the value of the property. 42 U.S.C. § 4014(h)(1)(B) (2012).
233. FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7; see supra note 232.
234. The subsidy would stay in effect until the property was sold, unless it was a
severe repetitive loss property, in which case the subsidy would begin to phase out in
2013. FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7; see supra note 232.
235. 42 U.S.C. § 4014 (g)(2) (2012) (repealed 2014); FEMA 2012 Overview, supra
note 7. FEMA had to consider catastrophic loss years in the calculation of the average
historical loss year. NAIC Overview, supra note 7. Another area of the legislation
concerned deductibles: until FEMA developed updated ratemaps, deductibles would be
between $1500 and $2000. Hornstein, supra note 3, at 33; see Biggert-Waters Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100210(b)(1)(A)–(B), 126 Stat.
405, 921 (codified at 42. U.S.C. § 4019 (2012)). After the FEMA maps were updated,
the deductibles were to be revised. Hornstein, supra note 3, at 33. Some subsidized
policyholders are not required to supply data on their flood risk so FEMA is asking them
to supply information voluntarily. GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra
note 3, at 4; see § 100205, 126 Stat. at 917–19 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4014–4015).
236. FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7. These provisions were not implemented
because the 2014 reforms eviscerated them. See Homeowner Flood Insurance
Affordability Act of 2014, P.L. No. 113-89, § 4, 128 Stat. 1020, 1022 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 4015); infra Part III.B.1.
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The basic idea was that flood risk maps would be revised and
premiums would ultimately reflect the property location’s current risk of
flooding, to take effect on the effective date of any revised or updated
maps.237 New properties insured under the NFIP were to be charged
“actuarial rates,” which means they would be charged rates that reflected
the actual risk. Risk-based rates would apply to new policies and
situations where a policy had lapsed because of the policyholder’s
“deliberate choice.”238 For subsidized homes currently insured under the
NFIP, rates could rise 20 to 30 percent over five years until those rates
also reflected actuarial risk.239 The 2012 reforms aimed to create a
reserve fund, and all policies were to be increased to begin raising money
for that reserve fund.240
b.

“Affordability” Study

BW-12 required eventual removal of all subsidies and for rates to be
based only on flood risk.241 However, Congress included a provision in
tension with the market-based framework of the reforms. It required a
study to be done by the National Academy of Sciences of methods to
encourage and maintain participation in the NFIP, to educate consumers
about the NFIP and flood risk, and to develop an “affordability
framework” through “targeted assistance rather than generally subsidized
rates including means-tested vouchers.”242 The 2012 reforms required
that the study would include a cost-benefit analysis of a flood insurance
program with full risk-based premiums and means-tested assistance for
those who cannot afford insurance, as compared to the existing system of
237. The statute provided that “any property located in an area that is participating in
the national flood insurance program shall have the risk premium rate charged for flood
insurance on such property adjusted to accurately reflect the current risk of flood to such
property, subject to any other provision of this Act.” 42 U.S.C. § 4015(h) (2012)
(repealed 2014).
238. 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)(3) (2012) (repealed 2014).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 4015(h) (2012) (repealed 2014).
Any increase in the risk premium charged for flood insurance on any property
that is covered by a flood insurance policy on the effective date of such an
update that is a result of such updating shall be phased in over a 5-year period,
at the rate of 20 percent for each year following such effective date.
Id.
240. FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7.
241. GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 11–12.
242. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. 112141, § 100236, 126 Stat. 405, 957. The GAO issued two reports in 2013 indicating that
more information was needed on different types of properties and subsidies. See
generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-858T, NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES (2013)
[hereinafter GAO, 2013 ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES REPORT]; GAO,
2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.
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subsidized flood insurance and “federal disaster relief for people without
coverage.”243 The law specified that the study was supposed to be
completed in 270 days.244
The incomes and assets of those who currently benefit from the
subsidies are difficult to ascertain. A large majority of the remaining
subsidies are in counties with high home values. The GAO notes that
“78.8% of subsidized policies are in counties that rank in the top 30% of
home values while 1.03% are in counties that rank in the bottom
30%.”245 Even in counties that rank high in overall home values,
however, there are homes that are not as highly valued and these may be
in the less desirable areas which may be the more flood-prone areas.
Very specific data about owners’ incomes are not available, and the
GAO states that “full-risk rates may be overly burdensome for some
owners and not for others.”246
c.

Improving Mapping and Grounding Maps in Science

The 2012 reforms authorized $400 million annually to the national
flood-mapping program.247 Congress directed FEMA to use the “most
accurate . . . data” in developing maps, and areas within the 100-year and
500-year floodplains, as well as “residual risk” areas, had to be

243. § 100236(b), 126 Stat. at 957. It is striking that Congress is here acknowledging
that disaster relief and flood insurance cover the same territory.
244. Id. § 100236(c).
245. GAO, 2013 ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES REPORT, supra note
3, at 21 tbl.4. These figures pertain to the 715,000 subsidized policies that remain after
the second home, business, and severe repetitive loss properties have been removed.
246. Id. at 36. Proponents of continuing the subsidies have argued that they do not
benefit the wealthy to the extent claimed by their opponents. See generally, e.g., Jeff
Harrington, Op-ed, Political Rhetoric That Subsidized Flood Insurance Rates Help Rich
Doesn't Mesh with Reality, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 13. 2013, 5:15 PM),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/banking/political-rhetoric-that-subsidizedflood-insurance-rates-help-rich-doesnt/2157000. Proponents of eliminating the subsidies
have argued to the contrary. See generally, e.g., R.J. Lehmann, Letter to the Editor,
Sifting Flood Program Data, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 20, 2013, 2:19 PM),
http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/letters/saturdays-letters-work-to-rid-the-world-ofnuclear-weapons/2157987; Carolyn Kousky & Howard Kunreuther, Addressing
Affordability in the National Flood Insurance Program, 1 J. EXTREME EVENTS 1 (2014);
R.J. Lehmann, About Those ‘Huge’ Flood Insurance Rate Increases, R STREET (Nov. 4,
2013),
http://www.rstreet.org/2013/11/04/about-those-huge-flood-insurance-rateincreases/ (arguing rate increases are not as extreme or widespread as opponents claim,
and that if a risk-based rate is extremely high, this suggests the risk is extremely high and
the price signal should be heeded).
247. § 100216(f), 126 Stat. at 930 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4101b(f) (2012)) (granting
authority to allocate $400 million annually between 2013 and 2017); Hornstein, supra
note 3, at 33.
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mapped.248 Appeals of mapping decisions were to be based only on their
technical and scientific validity.249 The Act also created a Scientific
Resolution Panel to address any mapping-related concerns raised by
those who are dissatisfied with any appeal to FEMA.250 The aim of these
provisions was to ensure that maps and rates are based on science and
not subject to political pressure.
d.

Other BW-12 Reforms

The NFIP has long required that lenders in flood-prone areas make
sure that borrowers have flood insurance because homeowners tend not
to buy flood insurance voluntarily.251 As lenders have often failed to
make sure homeowners have and keep flood insurance, the 2012 reforms
increased civil penalties on lenders that fail to ensure borrowers have
insurance and removed the time limit on annual penalties.252 The 2012
reforms also consolidated the three FEMA mitigation programs and
streamlined the process for release of mitigation grants.253
BW-12 paid explicit attention to privatization in addition to the
implicit aim of fostering the private market by removing subsidized
rates. First, it clarified that private flood insurance met the flood
insurance purchase requirement that went along with mortgages. 254 It
also required FEMA and the GAO to conduct studies and report to
Congress within 18 months with an assessment of the private insurance
market’s capacity to assume a portion of the NFIP risk. 255 BW-12 also

248. § 100216(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(C), 126 Stat. at 927 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
4101b(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(C)); Hornstein, supra note 3 at 33. Also relating to mapping
issues, the Act mandates that FEMA contract with the National Academy of Public
Administration to Conduct a study of coordination between FEMA and both federal and
state agencies concerning the mapping program and requires the Office of Management
and Budget to submit a report to Congress that specifically highlights budget issues
involving mapping when proposing FEMA’s annual budget. § 100220(a)(2), 126 Stat. at
933 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4101c(a)(2)).
249. § 100218(a), 126 Stat. at 930–31 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4104-1(a)(2)(A));
Hornstein, supra note 3, at 34.
250. § 100218(a), 126 Stat. at 930 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4104-1(a)(1)).
251. See supra Part I.B.4.
252. FRENCH WETMORE ET AL., supra note 105, at, 23–24; NAIC Overview, supra
note 7.
253. FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7.
254. NAIC Overview, supra note 7. It required the Federal Office of Insurance to
report to Congress on the state of the private market for natural catastrophe insurance. Id.
255. These studies have been done. See generally GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR
INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-179,
HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE: MULTIPLE CHALLENGES MAKE EXPANDING PRIVATE
COVERAGE DIFFICULT (2014).
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made clear that the NFIP had the authority to buy reinsurance to cover
catastrophic losses, which it had not done in the past.256
BW-12 also called for various studies, including a study of flood
risk determinations behind levees, a study of the private market for
natural catastrophe insurance, and a GAO study of subsidized
properties.257
2.

Summary of the 2012 Reforms

In BW-12 Congress moved from a solidaristic system of
homeowners’ flood insurance towards an actuarial approach with riskbased rates to be phased in over time.258 It specifically rejected the past
practice of having generally subsidized rates but indicated it was
concerned with flood insurance costs by requiring a study of methods to
develop an affordability framework.259 It shifted from an approach to
mapping that was vulnerable to political pressure to one that would be
based only on scientific principles. Congress strengthened provisions to
ensure demand, added a reserve fund plan, and took steps to encourage
private insurance. The gradual shift to risk-based pricing was seen as a
positive move which would lead to market rates and private competition,
both seen as good things. Market rates based on risk would more
accurately reflect the costs of the risks faced by living in flood-prone
areas, and this too was widely seen as a beneficial change.
B.

The Menendez-Grimm Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability
Act of 2014

Less than two years after the 2012 reforms, Congress did a partial
about-face, departing from the actuarial approach it had so recently
adopted, by passing the Menendez-Grimm Homeowners Flood Insurance
Affordability Act of 2014 (“MG-14”). MG-14 accepted some of the
subsidy rollbacks, such as the second home subsidy rollbacks, and
retrenched others such as the subsidy for old homes that were primary

256. NAIC Overview, supra note 7; GAO, 2011 ACTION NEEDED REPORT, supra note
68, at 6.
257. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. No. 112141, § 100231(a)(3), (c), (e)(1)(A), 126 Stat. 405, 949–50, 951, 952. The levee study,
subsidized property study, and private market study have been completed. NAT’L ACAD.
SCIS., Levee Report, supra note 30; GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra
note 3, at 1, 9; GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4.
258. See supra Part II.A–E.
259. See supra Part II.C.
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residences.260 It also did not change the 2017 reauthorization date of the
program put in place by Congress during the 2012 reforms.261
1.

Highlights of the 2014 Reforms

a.

“Striving” to Limit Premium Prices

MG-14 requires that FEMA must “strive to minimize the number of
policies [that have premiums which] exceed one percent of the total
coverage provided by the policy.”262 In other words, FEMA must strive
to make sure a policy with $250,000 of coverage does not have
premiums of more than $2500 per year, regardless of the flood risk of the
property.
b.

Subsidies: Reinstatement of Some and Continuing Gradual
Elimination of Others

i.

Some Subsidies Are Reinstated and a Surcharge is Added to
All Policies.

MG-14 restores the subsidies on older homes (pre-FIRM subsidies)
and the grandfathering subsidies.263 It requires refunds to homeowners
who paid higher rates as a result of the 2012 law for homes that are
primary residences and are not severe repetitive loss properties.264 These
subsidies cover 715,000 subsidized properties and by definition include
many of the highest risk properties.265
260. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, §
1(a), 128 Stat. 1020, 1020 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4001 note).
261. § 100203(a), 126 Stat. at 916 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4016(a) (2012)); National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS,
http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_nfip.htm (last updated Nov. 13, 204); see Dan
Farber, Sea Level Rises, Premiums Not so Much, LEGAL PLANET BLOG (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://legal-planet.org/2014/03/24/sea-level-rises-premiums-not-so-much.
262. § 7(j), 128 Stat. at 1023 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015). FEMA must
report to Congress when it fails to meet this goal. Id.
263. Id. § 4 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015) (“Restoration of Grandfathered
Rates”). This provision repealed § 1308 of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015(h)), which required premium adjustments to reflect the
current risk of flood based on updated maps, and stated that premiums could rise 20% per
year following new flood maps. Id.; National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §
4015(h) (2012) (repealed 2014).
264.
The new law provided that some policyholders receive refunds of higher
premiums paid under the 2012 reforms. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act:
Overview, FEMA.GOV 2 (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/13965519355974048b68f6d695a6eb6e6e7118d3ce464/HFIAA_Overview_FINAL_03282014.pdf
[hereinafter FEMA 2014 Overview].
265. GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
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When Congress passed the 2012 reforms requiring that rates should
be based on risk, FEMA did not have the information needed to
determine full risk rates for policies that no longer qualified for
subsidies.266 Subsidized rates were about 35–45 percent of what
actuarially sound rates would have been.267 FEMA therefore used a
working assumption that subsidized rates were about half of what fullrisk rates would be.268 FEMA tried to raise rates gradually and develop
maps at the same time.269
The 2012 reforms required that premiums be adjusted to reflect the
current risk of flood based on updated maps and stated that premiums
could rise 20–30 percent per year following new flood maps.270 But
MG-14 stopped those increases for homes that are primary residences.
Under MG-14, rates still can increase for subsidized properties by five
percent a year, and, with limited exceptions, rates cannot increase more
than 18 percent per year.271 The 2014 law added a surcharge to all
policies to offset the cost of the subsidized policies.272
ii.

Subsidies Remain when Subsidized Properties Are Sold and
when Subsidized Policies Have Lapsed.

Congress, in order to reduce the number of subsidized properties,
passed a “sale trigger” provision in 2012, so that, when a property that
benefited from a subsidized flood insurance policy was sold, the rates
would shift to market rates for the new owner.273 The real estate industry
objected strenuously once this provision went into effect.274 MG-14
repealed the sale trigger provision so that new owners of primary
residences in flood-prone areas will receive the existing subsidies.275

266. GAO, 2011 ACTION NEEDED REPORT, supra note 68, at 52; GAO, 2013
SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 30–32.
267. See supra note 68; Part I.A.4.
268.
GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 30–32 (2013);
FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7.
269. FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7.
270. Id.
271. FEMA 2014 Overview, supra note 264, at 2.
272. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, §
8, 128 Stat. 1020, 1023–24 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015a, 4017a). $25 was added
to each primary residence and $250 to all other policies. Id. § 8(a) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 4015a(b)(1)–(2)); FEMA 2014 Overview, supra note 264, at 3.
273. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
274. Robert R. M. Verchick & Lynsey R. Johnson, When Retreat Is the Best Option:
Flood Insurance after Biggert-Waters and other Climate Change Puzzles, 47 J. Marshall
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 18, 23), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2418089; see infra Part III.C.2.a.
275. § 3(a)(1)(A), 128 Stat. at 1021 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)).
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Changes in the rules about when a subsidized policy lapses were
also significant. The 2012 reforms had stated that if a homeowner
deliberately let his subsidized policy lapse, the subsidy would be gone
and a new policy on the property would have to be based on risk.276 The
2014 reforms were much more forgiving about situations when a policy
lapsed. They provided that if a policy had lapsed because the
homeowner had been told she was no longer required to purchase flood
insurance, the subsidy would continue.277
iii.

Gradual Subsidy Elimination for Second Homes, Businesses,
and Severe Repetitive Loss Properties Will Continue.

MG-14 leaves in place the gradual elimination of subsidies for
second homes, businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties that was
passed in 2012278 and provides that rates for those properties can rise by
25 percent a year.279 Thus, if a person owns a second home that had been
protected by an old house subsidy, that second home will gradually be
charged actuarial, risk-based rates. Similarly, if a person owns a severe
repetitive loss property or a business that has a subsidized policy, that
policy’s price gradually will rise to reflect flood risk. A total of 438,000
subsidized policies will gradually be shifted to risk-based rates.280
c.

“Affordability” Study Expanded

MG-14 significantly expands the provisions about affordability that
were in the 2012 law. The 2012 reforms specified that the National
276. See supra Part III.A.1.a.
277. § 3(a)(1)(B), 128 Stat. at 1021 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)(1)). The
new lapse provision states that rates will not rise to market rates if the policy lapsed
because the policyholder was told she was no longer required to have coverage. Id. This
shift is telling. Remember we are talking about homeowners in high-risk areas who had
deeply subsidized flood policies which lapsed, and considering whether they should be
able to get new subsidized policies or sell their property to someone else with it being
protected by a subsidized policy. The 2012 version left the owner with some
responsibility—if she deliberately let her subsidized policy lapse, she could not get it
back. By contrast, the 2014 version left the owner with much less responsibility—if she
let the policy lapse because it was no longer required, she could get it back. The owner
had no independent responsibility to consider her own risk and buy insurance
accordingly. From an insurance perspective, this is not sensible. If a policyholder of,
say, a life insurance policy let it lapse, a market-based insurance company would assess
the current risk when issuing a new policy and would not have to issue a policy based on
rates from earlier.
278. See supra Part III.A.1.a. For definition of severe repetitive loss properties, see
supra note 232.
279. FEMA 2014 Overview, supra note 264, at 2.
280. Id.; GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 13 (finding that
subsidies for second homes, businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties total
438,000).
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Academy of Sciences would conduct a study of methods for establishing
an affordability framework “through targeted assistance rather than
general subsidies.”281 The report was not finished by the time FEMA
began raising rates, which became a rallying cry for opponents who
argued that rate increases should be postponed until the study was
done.282 The Administrator of FEMA, Craig Fugate, testified without
contradiction in September 2013 that it might take two years for the
study to be completed and that he had no discretion to halt rate increases
in the meantime.283
The 2014 reforms added more money for the study and increased
the requirements attached to it. Now, the FEMA administrator must
develop a draft framework to address “the issues of affordability of flood
insurance sold under the National Flood Insurance Program, including
issues identified in the affordability study.”284 The new statute lists a
number of criteria that the Administrator must consider in preparing an

281. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, §
100236(a), 126 Stat. 405, 957.
282. See, e.g., Bruce Alpert, GNO Report Says FEMA Should Delay Flood Insurance
Premium Hikes Pending Affordability Study, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 11, 2013, 11:23
AM),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/09/gno_report_says_fema_should_de.html;
Romano, supra note 133. The lawsuit filed by the Mississippi Insurance Commissioner
against FEMA in September 2013 argues that this failure should halt all insurance rate
increases. Complaint at 29, Miss. Ins. Dep’t v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 13CV-379 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2013); Bibeka Shrestha, Miss. Regulator Sues US Over
Flood Insurance Rate Hikes, LAW360 (Sept. 27, 2013, 3:29 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/476231/miss-regulator-sues-us-over-flood-insurancerate-hikes.
283. FEMA Administrator 2013 Written Testimony, supra note 81; Andrew G.
Simpson, FEMA Chief Disappoints Senators, Says He Can’t Delay Flood Insurance
Rates,
INS.
J.
(Sept.
23,
2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/09/23/305915.htm. Phase One of
the study, to be undertaken by an ad hoc committee under the auspices of the National
Academy of Sciences, began on January 30, 2014. Project Information, NAT’L ACADS.,
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=49584 (last visited Oct. 16,
2014) (“Project title: Affordability of NFIP Premiums”). The legislation does not
require any particular outcome for the study, and the study itself at first glance seems that
it will be unwieldy and challenging. The focus area of the study, for example, is listed as
follows: “Behavioral and Social Sciences; Computers and Information Technology; Earth
Sciences; Engineering and Technology; Environment and Environmental Studies; Math,
Chemistry and Physics.” Id. An ad hoc committee will prepare two reports for FEMA.
The first will focus on definitions and assumptions related to an affordability framework,
while the second will propose alternative approaches for evaluating options for
affordability programs. Id. It will then be up to FEMA and Congress to decide what
course to take on affordability issues.
284. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, §
9(a), 128 Stat. 1020, 1024.
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affordability framework, including the effect of rate increases on
participation.285
d.

More Congressional Oversight Added for Mapping

The 2012 reforms were clear that mapping should be only based on
scientific evidence. The new law has added provisions that seem to be in
tension with this principle. For example, in developing the “affordability
framework,” the FEMA administrator is required to consider “the impact
flood insurance rate map updates have on the affordability of flood
insurance.”286 Congress will review implementation of the mapping
program,287 and new provisions have been added so that each member of
Congress with constituents affected by map changes will have more
information about the progress of the mapping process.288 Lastly, FEMA
must pay for the costs of successful map appeals by homeowners.289
e.

New Flood Insurance Advocate Position Created

The 2014 reforms require FEMA to designate a Flood Insurance
Advocate for the first time. That person’s overall job is “to advocate for
the fair treatment of policyholders under the National Flood Insurance
Program and property owners in the mapping of flood hazards, the
identification of risks from flood, and the implementation of measures to
minimize the risk of flood.”290 The statute does not define “fair
treatment.”
f.

Variety in Policies and Clear Communication Encouraged

MG-14 allows for more variety in policies by several means,
responding to criticisms of the standard flood policy as one-size-fitsall.291 It encourages high-deductible policies, which presumably would

285. Id. § 9(b).
286. Id. § 9(b)(5).
287. Id. § 17.
288. Id.
289. § 18, 128 Stat. at 1027 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4017(a), 4104(f)).
290. Id. § 24. The duties of the advocate will include educating policyholders and
property holders on flood and flood insurance related matters, assisting policyholders in
understanding the program and understanding how to appeal preliminary rate maps,
assisting in developing regional capacity to respond to individual concerns about flood
insurance, coordinate outreach and education with local officials and community leaders
in areas affected by proposed map changes, and aid policyholders in obtaining accurate
information about rates. Id.
291. This criticism was made by Kevin Boyle, Managing Editor of the Rockaway
Wave newspaper, at a panel at Columbia University Center for Climate Change on
December 4, 2013. Kevin Boyle, Soaring Flood Insurance Rates: Should Congress Step
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be cheaper than low-deductible policies.292 Second, it requires that an
owner’s flood mitigation activities, which are not part of the structure
itself, be taken into account in determining rates.293 Third, it does not
require that detached structures be insured for flood.294 The NFIP is
required to clearly communicate flood risk information to policyholders
even if they have subsidized policies under the new law.295
2.

Summary of 2014 Reforms

In MG-14, Congress retreated from eventual elimination of all
subsidies as called for in 2012 but did continue with the gradual
elimination of 438,000 subsidized policies, namely those for second
homes, businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties. 715,000
subsidies were reinstated, specifically those for older homes and
grandfathered homes that are primary residences. These subsidies were
for old houses built without flood risk in mind and for properties where
flood risk had increased but the properties had received lower rates in the
past. While Congress had called for a study of affordability and
participation in 2012, the 2014 reforms expanded both the funding for
and the requirements of the study. Congress instructed the NFIP to
“strive” to limit premium prices to one percent of the coverage, even if
that was far below what a risk-based premium would be. The mapping
provisions of the 2012 law, which called for scientific principles to
determine mapping decisions, were not repealed, but several provisions
of the law require more congressional oversight of the mapping process.
The new law requires clear communication of flood risk to all
policyholders and called for a new “Flood Insurance Advocate” to
communicate with and advocate for policyholders.
With its
reinstatement of most subsidies and focus on affordability, Congress
retreated from its actuarial approach of 2012 and returned to its former
broad solidaristic approach.

In?, COLUM. L. SCH., http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/conferences-andevents (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
292. § 12, 128 Stat. at 1025 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4013(d)) (amending 42
U.S.C. § 4013 to provide that the Administrator shall make available policies with
deductibles of up to and including $10,000).
293. Id. § 14 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(1)(A)) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
4014(a)(1)(A), titled “Accounting for Flood Mitigation Activities in Estimates of
Premium Rates”).
294. Id. § 13(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4012a).
295. Id. § 28 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015(l)).
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Lessons of Failed Reforms

This section discusses first why the 2012 reforms were passed and
why many of those reforms were repealed in 2014. It is important to
remember that while there are no easy solutions to the dilemmas
presented by floods and climate change, nonetheless the NFIP and
federal flood policy could be much improved, as discussed in Part IV.296
1.

Why the 2012 Reforms Passed

BW-12 passed with a large bipartisan majority and was signed by
the President on July 6, 2012, three months before Superstorm Sandy hit
the New York City metropolitan area.297 Congress seemed to have taken
sensible steps gradually to move away from its much-criticized and
expensive taxpayer subsidization of flood risk. Four main reasons
account for the changes. First, the reforms were based on decades of
criticism of the NFIP’s finances, and its actuarial, market-based approach
chimed with a popular market-based approach to government. Second, a
broad coalition of groups with diverse concerns supported the reforms.
Third, the groups that could be affected by risk-based rates were not
paying attention to the legislation when it was pending. Fourth, no
hurricanes had caused massive floods recently.
a.

Direct Response to Criticism and Reflection of Popular
Market-Based Approach

The 2012 reforms were not surprising; they directly responded to
decades of GAO reports and other criticism of the NFIP and its
finances.298 The House had passed a version of these reforms in 2006; a
similar bill was introduced in the Senate that same year.299 The reforms
can be seen as part of an actuarial approach to government which has
been gaining ground over the past few decades; under this approach,
market reforms are seen as a positive, efficient development.300 The
subsidy elimination would, for the most part, have been very gradual and
grounded in scientifically sound maps, so the law did not seem like an

296. The issues are hard for a host of reasons, including these: (1) the type of risk is
one that is hard to predict and that people tend to discount; (2) the damages caused if the
risk comes to fruition are astronomical; (3) the federal government has carrots but no
good sticks; (4) and it is very hard for a democratically-elected government to take away
benefits once granted to people who vote.
297. Verchick & Johnson, supra note 274 (manuscript at 21).
298. See supra Part III.A.
299. See supra notes 224–27 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 221, at 7–8, 11.
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extreme measure.301 The law had a provision about the need for an
affordability study, which reflected solidaristic concerns, but this was not
a prominent part of the law at the time; it seemed clear that the general
subsidies which had endured for decades eventually would be a thing of
the past.302
b.

Effective Advocacy by a Diverse Coalition of Groups

An interesting coalition of environmental groups, insurance groups,
and free market reformers, smartersafer.org, worked hard on getting the
reforms passed. The gradual move to risk-based rates, which would
encourage the private market to insure for floods, appealed to all three
groups.303 The final draft did not mention climate change, but with rates
slated to eventually be determined based on risk, it seemed that Congress
recognized the potential increased flood risk from climate change.304 All
taxpayers eventually would benefit by a small amount since they no
longer would be bailing out the NFIP, and eventually disaster relief costs
might be reduced or their growth slowed.
c.

Inattentiveness of Potentially Affected Parties

Another reason the 2012 reforms passed is that they did not receive
much attention at the time. The flood insurance reforms were included
in a lengthy transportation bill, and there was not a separate hearing on
these provisions in 2012.305 Flood insurance reform was not even
mentioned in President Obama’s signing statement.306 Senator Mary
Landrieu of Louisiana noted at the time that the flood insurance law
would need to be “fixed,” stated she regretted it did not have
affordability provisions, and said that it would be impossible to vote
against the bill in which it was included.307 Apart from Senator
Landrieu’s statement, there were few objections from Congress. Other

301. See supra Part III.A.1.a.
302. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, §
100236, 126 Stat. 405, 957; see supra Part III.A.1.b.
303. Lehrer, supra note 226, at 352 (describing the coalition, SmarterSafer.org).
304. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 199, at 84.
305. Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126
Stat. 405. The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 was Title II of
Division F in the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act. Id.
306. See President Obama Signs Bill to Create Jobs, Restore America’s
Transportation
System,
WHITE
HOUSE
(July
9,
2012,
2:29
PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/07/09/president-obama-signs-bill-create-jobsrestore-americas-transportation-system.
307. Alpert, supra note 222.

WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

412

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

1/15/2015 3:26 PM

[Vol. 119:2

representatives of coastal areas, constituents, and the real estate industry
all seemed to be inattentive.
Perhaps those who would be affected by the bill assumed it would
not pass; the risk of its passage may have seemed like a low probability,
high impact event—the kind of risk that behavioral economics tells us
people routinely discount. After the many years that Congress had been
urged to reform the NFIP and did not do anything significant, observers
may have thought that Congress would not actually pass consequential
reforms in 2012.
d.

Lack of Major Recent Storms or Floods

A fourth factor contributing to the 2012 reforms is the lack of major
hurricanes immediately prior to their passage. Although Hurricane Irene
in fall 2011 had been significant, there were no huge hurricanes or floods
immediately prior to the passage of BW-12. It seems safe to say that if
Superstorm Sandy had struck in June 2012 rather than October 2012, the
2012 reforms would not have passed.308 Sandy, with its devastating
flood damage, focused attention on the hardships of floods to the
individuals suffering them, rather than the more diffuse costs of the NFIP
on which Congress focused when it passed the 2012 reforms.
e.

The Popularity of Fiscal Stability as a Goal

Some might argue that Congress, in requiring the gradual move
towards risk-based rates, departed from the Flood Act’s goal of
providing flood insurance “on reasonable terms and conditions”309
without much public debate. But on the other hand, the goal of
providing flood insurance on “reasonable terms and conditions” could
also mean providing insurance based on the actual risk of flood loss as
the 2012 reforms required. Such insurance might well be both
reasonable, because it is based on actual risk, and unaffordable, because
the flood risk may be high. Congress seemed to recognize the possible
contradiction between requiring actuarial rates and the original goals of
the Flood Act by calling for the much-invoked “affordability study,”
which seems to be based on solidaristic ideas rather than actuarial
ones.310 Still, the dominant idea of the 2012 reforms was returning the
NFIP to fiscal stability, a popular and seemingly modest goal at the time.

308. Verchick & Johnson, supra note 274 (manuscript at 21).
309. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2012).
310. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, §
100236, 126 Stat. 405, 957.
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Why the 2012 Reforms Were Reformed in 2014

In 2014, many of the reforms were modified, though as noted above
some of the subsidy rollbacks have been maintained. This section
explores why many of the 2012 reforms were rescinded in 2014. Four
main reasons account for the changes: (1) intense lobbying and pressure
from affected people and industry, particularly in the wake of Hurricane
Sandy; (2) individual narratives conveyed by superficial press attention
that could not be countered by the pro-reform side; (3) common human
responses to flood risk and climate change risk as predicted by
behavioral economics; and (4) FEMA’s difficult situation and weak
communications.
a.

Intense Lobbying and Pressure from the Real Estate Industry
and Affected People and Groups

Superstorm Sandy in October 2012 struck densely populated and
politically powerful areas of New York and New Jersey three months
after the 2012 reforms were signed.311 Many coastal high-flood-risk
areas flooded, causing untold hardship, some loss of life, and billions of
dollars of losses. Many homes in these high-risk areas were older homes
that had been receiving subsidized rates for almost 50 years and were
scheduled to gradually move to risk-based rates when maps were
revised.312 FEMA began releasing its draft maps and risk-based rates
around that time.313 Some people in older homes in flood zones that had
long been receiving subsidies learned that much higher rates were in
store.314 Others found that newer homes in areas that were newly
mapped as flood-prone areas also eventually would face much higher
rates.315 Those affected organized grassroots opposition, starting with a
Facebook page, to “stop FEMA now.”316 The New York and New Jersey
opponents of rate increases joined forces with the Gulf Coast opponents,
leading to a powerful opposition movement.317 Groups including the
National Association of Homebuilders, the National League of Cities,
and local and state governments all worked to overturn the 2012
reforms.318
311. Verchick & Johnson, supra note 274 (manuscript at 21).
312. Id. (manuscript at 22).
313. Id. (manuscript at 21).
314. Id. (manuscript at 22).
315. Id.
316. Stop FEMA Now, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/StopFemaNow (last
visited Oct. 17, 2014); STOP FEMA NOW, http://www.stopfemanow.com (last visited Oct.
17, 2014).
317. Verchick & Johnson, supra note 274 (manuscript at 22).
318. Id. (manuscript at 23).
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The “sale trigger” provision became a target. When a house that
had been receiving a subsidy was sold, the premium rate for the new
owner would be risk-based, per the 2012 reforms.319 In fall 2013, the
real estate industry began to claim this was destroying the nascent real
estate recovery and industry lobbyists deluged Washington with
complaints.320
The financial beneficiaries of the 2012 reforms were taxpayers in
general, who would cease bailing out the NFIP if its rates are based on
risk. Yet, although the group Taxpayers for Common Sense and other
members of the coalition that supported the reforms worked hard to keep
the reforms in place, their voices were faint compared with the scores of
organized coastal residents and the real estate industry.321
The arguments for subsidy continuation were rarely on the merits of
why the subsidies should continue into their fifth decade when flood
risks were increasing. Instead, they focused only on how unaffordable
the rate increases were and how they were allegedly hurting the housing
market.322 One of the original sponsors of the law, Representative

319. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. No. 112141, § 100205(a)(1)(B), 126 Stat. 405, 917 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)(2) (2012))
(repealed 2014); see Part III.A.1.a (describing sale trigger provision).
320. See, e.g., Drew Harwell, Flood-Insurance Hikes Ravage Tampa Bay
Neighborhood Home Sales, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 29, 2013, 8:46 PM),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/realestate/flood-insurance-hikes-ravage-tampabay-neighborhood-home-sales/2158922; Opinion, Flooding Capitol Hill: Republicans
Cave to the Realtors on Taxpayer Flood Insurance, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2014, 7:20
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304610404579403361900877906
?KEYWORDS=Flooding+Capitol+Hill+Republicans+cave+to+the+Realtors+on+taxpay
er+flood+insurance&mg=reno64wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB1000142405270230461040
4579403361900877906.html%3FKEYWORDS%3DFlooding%2BCapitol%2BHill%2BR
epublicans%2Bcave%2Bto%2Bthe%2BRealtors%2Bon%2Btaxpayer%2Bflood%2Binsur
ance.
321. See, e.g., Steve Ellis, Steve Ellis: Resist the Urge to Roll Back Flood Insurance
Reforms, SUN HERALD, Oct. 7, 2013, at 11; Don’t Gut Flood Insurance Reform by
Extending Subsidies!, R STREET (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.rstreet.org/outreach/dont-gutflood-insurance-reform-by-extending-subsidies-2/;
Smartersafer.org: Flood Insurance Reforms Should be Modified – Not Abandoned,
SMARTERSAFER.ORG
(Jan.
30,
2014),
http://www.smartersafer.org/floodreform/smartersafer-org-flood-insurance-reforms-should-be-modified-not-abandoned;
Lehmann, supra note 246.
322. See, e.g., Harwell, supra note 320; Tracie Mauriello, Rising Cost of Flood
Insurance Inspires Bill, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE (Jan. 11, 2014, 10:29 PM),
http://www.post-gazette.com/news/nation/2014/01/12/Rising-cost-of-flood-insuranceinspires-bill/stories/201401120157; Warren Kulo, Palazzo Debunks Myths Surrounding
Flood Insurance and Homeowners (Video), GULFLIVE.COM (Jan. 9, 2014, 1:55 PM),
http://blog.gulflive.com/mississippi-pressnews/2014/01/palazzo_debunks_myths_surround.html (quoting Rep. Steven Palazzo of
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Maxine Waters, puzzlingly framed the rate increases as “unintended
consequences,” when rates based on risk, which in some cases would be
much higher than subsidized rates, were exactly what the law required.323
The result, keeping in place most of the subsidies, is not surprising
under basic interest-group theory. As Professor Amy Sinden notes,
“[B]asic and well-accepted principles of interest-group theory predict
that a group whose interests are diffuse and have less marginal impact on
each individual member will have far more difficulty organizing into an
effective pressure group than a smaller group in which each member
suffers substantial economic harm.”324 Further, those affected brought a
powerful “intensity of preference” to the process, presenting accounts of
grievance and injustice.325 Under this theory, it is predictable that the
more diffuse group of individuals and organizations who would benefit
from the legislation were unable to mobilize the power to maintain the
subsidy rollbacks. This does not explain why Congress kept in place the
gradual subsidy rollbacks for second homes, businesses, and severe
repetitive loss properties, and interest-group theory does not of course
explain every outcome.326 The next subsections may assist with that
explanation.
b.

Powerful Individual Narratives and Superficial Press Attention

The debate about rolling back the 2012 reforms was often framed in
the media and by politicians as a story of the middle class or working
class homeowner being unable to pay for or sell her house because of the
increased rates imposed without warning or justification by the big bad
government.327 Stories melded the hardships caused by Superstorm
Sandy with hardships stemming from flood insurance rate increases.328
Representative Waters’s claim of “unintended consequences” was

Mississippi) (“I’m hearing from teachers, veterans, people who work at the shipyards in
support of our Navy. These are everyday Americans.”).
323. See Daniel Newhauser & Emma Dumain, Flood Insurance Bill Goes Back to
Rewrite, ROLL CALL (Feb. 26, 2014, 10:32 AM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/218/floodinsurance-bill-postponed/ (quoting Rep. Maxine Waters) (stating that goal of the 2014
revisions was to correct the “unintended consequences” of 2014 reforms).
324. Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in
Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1438 (2005).
325. See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, 104–07 (2003); Daniel A.
Farber, Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions 4–5 (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Pub.
Law,
Research
Paper
No.
2396056
(2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2396056.
326. See generally Farber, supra note 325, at 4–5.
327. See, e.g., Harwell, supra note 320; Mauriello, supra note 322; Kulo, supra note
322.
328. See infra notes 329–35 and accompanying text.
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parroted by reporters,329 displaying an unfortunate example of how that
label tends to stunt analysis of policy in favor of facile conclusions.330
If homeowners had not purchased flood insurance protecting their
homes and possessions from Sandy’s damage, this decision often was
blamed on the government. One article, for example, was titled “Federal
Maps Left New York Unprepared for Sandy—and FEMA Knew It!”331
It showcased a Queens couple with a house very near the ocean who let
their flood policy lapse a few months before Sandy because they had not
made a claim in 20 years and their house was not in a high-risk zone. It
did not mention that insurance outside a high-risk flood zone would have
been much cheaper than insurance in a high-risk flood zone, that FEMA
had recommended people outside high-risk zones buy flood insurance, or
that FEMA had for decades been trying to get more money for its
mapping program.332 It did not present homeowners as responsible for
their decisions not to purchase insurance. The story had a victim (middle
class, white homeowner) and a villain (the federal government,
specifically FEMA).333 Nor did media coverage include context such as
the nature, length, effects of or original intent of the subsidies.334 Nor did
they refer to how building codes often are lightly enforced in coastal
regions, leading to more property at risk.335 They did not mention the
incentive effects of the subsidies, such as promoting building in floodprone areas or discouraging large renovations or flood mitigation
projects.336 They presented solidaristic notions of how flood insurance
should be priced (not too high) but did not present a reason for that
conclusion.
Press stories from Florida and elsewhere featured claims from real
estate organizations and brokers that the new flood insurance law was
ravaging the just recovering real estate market.337 Press articles did not
question whether these claims were accurate. The R Street Institute, one
329. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Popular Flood Insurance Law is Target for Both
Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2014, at A14 (“It appears to be another Washington story of
unintended consequences.”).
330. See generally Martha T. McCluskey, How the “Unintended Consequences”
Story Promotes Unjust Intent and Impact, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 21 (2012).
331. Christie Thompson et al., Fed Flood Maps Left NY Unprepared for Sandy – and
FEMA Knew It, WNYC.ORG (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.wnyc.org/story/fed-flood-mapsleft-ny-unprepared-sandy-and-fema-knew-it.
332. See, e.g., Houck, supra note 97. The Rockaway Wave newspaper kept up a
steady drumbeat of information and advocacy against flood insurance rate increases.
Boyle, supra note 291.
333. Stories generally did not feature minority or poor homeowners.
334. See supra Part II.C.
335. See supra Parts I.A.4, II.C.
336. See supra Part II.C.
337. See, e.g., Harwell, supra note 320.
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of the members of the smartersafer.org coalition, questioned whether this
actually was true,338 but to no avail. Once the claim was made and
supported with a few individual stories, it was repeated as if true.
On the other side, in favor of moving towards market rates, were
advocates trying to frame the issue as part of a different narrative.
Taxpayers for Common Sense portrayed the NFIP as an example of
government waste,339 and the R Street Institute highlighted the hypocrisy
of fiscal conservatives who supported the subsidies but opposed other
government giveaways.340 The smartersafer.org coalition included these
groups as well as environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and
National Wildlife Federation, insurance companies, and others bringing
together environmental and fiscal concerns concerning overbuilding,
sustainability, and deficits.341 The coalition called on Congress to follow
through on the reforms and develop a targeted assistance plan for truly
needy policyholders.342 But on this side there was no powerful human
narrative and no heartrending image. And the effect on the taxpayers
who were paying for disaster relief as well as the NFIP subsidies and
bailouts was very hard to convey and to see.
Recall that Congress left intact the 2012 subsidy rollbacks for
second homes, businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties. The
possible narratives that groups affected by removal of those subsidies
could present were less viscerally and visually compelling. Although
efforts were made to argue that owners of second homes should not be
subject to increased rates, these efforts did not gain traction.343 Even
though some small businesses were gradually losing subsidies, the policy
idea was probably that the cost of risk-based pricing, introduced in
phases, would be gradually passed on to customers. Severe repetitive
loss properties, which by definition already had received extensive flood

338. R.J. Lehmann, Flood Insurance and the Phantom Real Estate Crash, R STREET
(Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.rstreet.org/2014/01/31/flood-insurance-and-the-phantomreal-estate-crash.
339. Ellis, supra note 321.
340. Eli Lehrer, The GOP’s Insurance Hypocrisy, HUFFPOST POL. (Nov. 1, 2013, 5:31
PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/eli-lehrer/gop-insurance-hypocrisy_b_4194784.html.
341. See Coalition, SMARTERSAFER.ORG, http://www.smartersafer.org/coalition (last
visited Oct. 18, 2014) (listing coalition partners).
342. Congress Must Implement Flood Insurance Reforms as Planned,
SMARTERSAFER.ORG
(Sept.
16,
2013),
http://www.smartersafer.org/floodreform/smartersafer-org-congress-must-implement-flood-insurance-reforms-as-planned.
343. See, e.g., Sue Belka, FEMA Unfair to Owners of Second Homes, PRESS
ATLANTIC CITY (Apr. 2014), http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/opinion/letters/femaunfair-to-owners-of-second-homes/article_b5eb95b6-9ab2-53f0-b711b57c8c949fed.html?mode=jqm.
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insurance benefits, made an even less compelling case for continuing
subsidies.344
c.

Common Human Response to Floods and Climate Change as
Predicted by Behavioral Economics

Part of the shocked, outraged, and ultimately organized response to
the rate increases may be due to the perception that the risk of floods and
increased damage from climate change are so remote that it does not
make sense to spend much money preparing for them.345 Unfortunately,
people tend to inadequately prepare for low-probability, high-loss events
because they often underestimate the magnitude of these events.346 The
ostensible remoteness of the future events makes it seem like an outrage
that people would have to pay significant amounts for the risk of living
in a particular area. This may be exacerbated when people expect
disaster relief347 and is true even when people accept the reality of
climate change.348
The challenge of making flood risk salient at times other than right
after floods is significant349 and is captured in an exchange between
Senator Elizabeth Warren and Craig Fugate, Administrator of FEMA, in
a hearing in fall 2013. Senator Warren uses the example of a constituent
living near a creek “which has never flooded” in anyone’s memory,
whose house is now in a flood zone thanks to new maps, and who wants
to appeal that determination.350 Administrator Fugate tries to make the
point that the fact that the creek “has never flooded” is not very
significant because what FEMA is looking at is risk of flood, over 100
years. But Senator Warren seems unconvinced.

344. See supra Part III.A.1.a.
345. See supra Part II.B.2.
346. Scales, supra note 3, at 9–10.
347. See supra Parts I.B.8, II.E.
348. Sen. Robert Menendez recognizes climate change and seems not to recognize the
contradiction between the higher risks accompanying climate change and affordable
flood insurance:
From my own personal view, I think climate change is an important thing . . . .
But for this coalition [to roll back the 2012 reforms] we have one singular
focus. And that focus is making sure that middle class families do not get
priced out of what they have spent a lifetime to achieve, which is their home.
Evan Lehmann, In Flood Insurance Fight, Some Climate Change Activists Battle Against
Quicker
Adaptation,
E&E
PUBLISHING,
LLC
(Oct.
30,
2013),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059989658 (quoting Sen. Robert Menendez).
349. See supra Part II.B.2.
350. Hearing on FEMA Flood Maps, YOUTUBE (Sept. 19, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-3FfpCtHZQ8.

WRIGGINS FINAL [SEND TO PRINT] (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

d.

1/15/2015 3:26 PM

FLOOD MONEY

419

FEMA’s Difficult Situation, Weak Communication, and
Response

FEMA’s challenges also contributed to BW-12’s demise. As
mentioned earlier, Congress had called for FEMA to contract with the
National Academy of Sciences for a study related to a targeted approach
to affordability issues, and the study was not finished by the deadline
Congress specified.351 Examination of the affordability study provision
shows that Congress did not make the rate increases contingent on the
study being done. Moreover, given the wide breadth of the study, it
seems completely unrealistic to think that it ever could have been
completed in 270 days. Nonetheless, its incompleteness was vocally
used by Senator Schumer and others to halt the gradual elimination of
some subsidies.352
In 2013, as FEMA released flood maps and proposed rates, and the
public outcry from a few policyholders ensued, FEMA did not say much
in response. When policyholders told the press about high new rates,
FEMA could have responded more forcefully with information about the
properties, showing their higher risk and that the rate increases were
capped by the law at 25 percent per year, but FEMA seemingly did
not.353 Some in Congress blamed FEMA for implementing the law
Congress passed.354

351. See supra Parts III.A.1.b, III.B.1.c.
352. Long Island News & PRs, Schumer Announces Vote on Bipartisan Bill That
Would Delay Excessive Flood Insurance Rate Increases for Thousands of New Yorkers,
LONGISLAND.COM (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.longisland.com/news/01-07-14/schumerannounces-vote-on-bipartisan-bill-that-would-delay-excessive-flood-insurance-rateincreases.html (quoting Sen. Schumer) (“Residents are still recovering from the
destructive force of Superstorm Sandy, and they should not be forced to pay unaffordable
premiums as they attempt to rebuild, especially because FEMA has not come close to
completing the required affordability study.”); Bipartisan Deal Reached to Delay Flood
Insurance
Premium
Hikes:
Waters,
INS.
J.,
(Oct.
28,
2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/10/28/309383.htm; Brad Plumer,
Congress Tried to Cut Subsidies for Homes in Flood Zones. It Was Harder than They
Thought,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
30,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/30/congress-tried-to-stopsubsidizing-homes-in-flood-zones-it-was-harder-than-they-thought/.
353. See, e.g., Mauriello, supra note 322 (quoting a business-owner whose premiums
allegedly would go up tenfold). FEMA’s fact sheet and the law itself said that rate
increases were limited to 24% per year. See Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act
of 2012: Impact of National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Changes, FEMA.GOV
(Apr.
2013),
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1909-250450554/bw12_sec_205_207_factsheet4_13_2013.pdf.
354. Senate Takes First Step on Flood Insurance, Agent Licensing Bill, INS. J. (Jan.
27, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/01/27/318549.htm
(quoting Rep. Maxine Waters blaming FEMA for rate increases).
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FEMA was in a difficult position because rates needed to go up
before maps were completed. The fact that the maps were not completed
in itself should not have been too significant since it had long been
known that subsidized rates were less than half of the risk-based rates.355
The 2012 reforms required that rates in high-risk zones on subsidized old
homes increase 25 percent per year.356 So it made sense for FEMA to
start increasing rates and work on maps at the same time. FEMA did not
have specific data to show Congress how many (or how few) people
were affected by map changes, and Administrator Fugate testified the
number was “thousands.”357 But, given the weakness of the mapping
program (thanks to Congress’s underfunding), the maps were suspect,
which gave fuel to opponents to argue against the rate increases.
e.

Summary of Reforms and Retreat

This section has considered how the 2012 reforms happened and
how the partial about-face by Congress occurred in 2014. The 2012
reforms were in tune with the market approach to government that has
gained prominence in recent years, responded to extensive criticism of
the NFIP, and were passed without negatively affected constituencies
organizing vocal opposition.
When the reforms started to be
implemented, several factors came together to undermine their staying
power. The combination of Superstorm Sandy and new flood maps in
the New Jersey and New York area added to the seeming affront of the
rate increases and spurred organized opposition in the Northeast, Gulf
Coast, and elsewhere. The intense lobbying and pressure by people
affected by the removal of the subsidies, which was not on the merits but
rather on the cost of the insurance, was powerful. The real estate lobby
played an influential role, arguing that rate increases threatened to scuttle
the economic recovery. Local and state governments also were
concerned. The large but diffuse group negatively affected by retaining
the subsidies did not speak as loudly to their elected representatives.
General interest-group theory would anticipate this result. The narrative
of the middle-class homeowner facing exorbitant rates was vivid, and
claims of negative effects on the real estate market were accepted at face
value. The common human response of underestimating the magnitude
of flood and climate change risks contributed to the outrage at increased
rates. Finally, the difficult position of FEMA, the failure to complete the
“affordability study,” and its weak communication also helped make the

355.
356.
357.

GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 31–32.
FEMA 2012 Overview, supra note 7.
Hearing on FEMA Flood Maps, supra note 350 (quoting Administrator Fugate).
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subsidy rollbacks vulnerable. The merits of continuing or discontinuing
the subsidies were rarely mentioned directly in the debates.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESS IN 2017
Congress’s about-face between 2012 and 2014 shows how dynamic
flood insurance policy can be. The factors that led to the repeal of the
2014 reforms—lobbying by affected industries and individuals, powerful
individual narratives with superficial media attention, avoidance of
thinking about risks like floods and climate change, and weak
communication from FEMA—all will likely continue in the future and
may result in Congress kicking the can down the road even beyond 2017.
However, this does not have to be the result. There is now an
opportunity for widespread education about the risks and costs of climate
change and floods. The public has the opportunity to consider whether
and how to take a solidaristic approach to flood risk and federal flood
insurance. Congress, the media, and the public now have time to
consider and reframe the issues in a deeper way than a panicked response
to rate increases. This section builds on the prior analysis and offers
recommendations for Congress to consider. Four main recommendations
result from this analysis. First, mapping must be protected from political
influence. Second, subsidies should gradually be phased out. Third, a
targeted affordability plan should be passed. Fourth, a comprehensive
strategy should be developed to deal with the long-term effects of floods
and climate change.
A.

Flood Risk Mapping: Mapping Should Be Protected from Political
Influence.

The mapping process needs to be grounded in the most accurate
scientific principles. There really is no counterargument to this point,
and if the maps are unassailable they will create a strong ground for rate
reform. Opponents of rate reform have always been able to point to the
weakness of the mapping program as a way of attacking reform, but
excellent maps will make this impossible.358

358. Even scientifically accurate maps may not help as much as hoped since many
Americans have both a distrust of science and of government. See generally Marshall,
supra note 24, at 144–46 (noting American distrust of government); Emily Swanson,
Americans Have Little Faith in Scientists, Science Journalists: Poll, HUFFPOST SCI. (Dec.
21,
2013,
11:23
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/21/faith-inscientists_n_4481487.html; Gordon Gauchat, Politicization of Science in the Public
Sphere: A Study of Public Trust in the United States, 1974 to 2010, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 167
(2012).
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By 2017, the remapping hopefully will have concluded. For maps
to be adopted as final, the community must approve them.359 Map
creation, according to the 2012 reforms, is supposed to be nonpolitical
and based only on scientific principles.360 Congress will receive a report
from FEMA about how the process will work, according to the 2014
reforms.361 The mapping process must be above politics and political
pressure; sadly, recent press reports and an FBI investigation of
remapping suggest that the mapping process may be subject to pressure
and manipulation by wealthy landowners.362 For people to have faith in
maps, rates, and the process, scientific objectivity is essential.
The 2014 reforms create risks of continuing the politicization of the
mapping process in at least two ways. First, they require the FEMA
Administrator to consider “the impact flood insurance rate map updates
have on the affordability of flood insurance” in his report to Congress on
the “Affordability Framework.”363 This may put pressure on the
Administrator to forego map updates that show higher flood risk in
politically powerful areas. Second, the required appointment of a “Flood
Insurance Advocate” whose job includes arguing for “the fair treatment
of policy holders . . . in the mapping of flood hazards”364 may put
additional political pressure on the mapping. This notion of “fair
treatment . . . in the mapping of flood hazards” has the potential for
politicizing the mapping process, since it may seem to many
homeowners who find their homes at high flood risk that analyses based
on scientific risk are not “fair.”365 But hopefully the Advocate will take
the position that maps based on valid scientific principles are “fair” even
359. Brochure, FEMA, Adoption of Flood Insurance Rate Maps by Participating
Communities 5 (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/20130726-1903-25045-4716/fema_495.pdf.
360. See Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. No.
112-141, §§ 100215–100218, 126 Stat. 405, 924–32 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4101a,
4101b, 4104, 4104–1 (2012)); supra Part III.A.1.c.
361. The 2014 reforms require specific communication to Congress that the program
will result in “technically credible flood hazard data.” Homeowner Flood Insurance
Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 17, 128 Stat. 1020, 1027 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 4101d).
362.
Richard Rainey, FBI Investigating FEMA for Coastal Flood Map Boundary
Changes, NBC Reports, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE
(April 2, 2014),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/04/fbi_investigating_fema
for_coa.hmtl.
363. See supra Part III.C.2.
364. § 24(a), 128 Stat. at 1030 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4033(a)).
365. This brings up the classic debate over what “fairness” means and should mean
in insurance: is it actuarial fairness or some other concept of fairness? See generally
BAKER, supra note 5, at ch. 1; ABRAHAM, supra note 5; Leah Wortham, The Economics of
Insurance Classification: The Sound of One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 83
(1986); Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517
(1983).
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if they show increased flood risk to homeowners. Also, the Advocate
may be able to foster better communication between FEMA and the
public. FEMA has strong new incentives to make sure maps are accurate
because the 2014 reforms let homeowners receive costs of successful
appeals.366
In the 2012 and 2014 reforms, Congress created the tools to make it
possible for the mapping process to be based on scientific principles,
unswayed by political pressure.367 Some Congressmen and women have
had a tendency to blame FEMA when their constituents complain about
flood insurance.368 If reform is to be successful, Congress instead needs
to stand behind FEMA when it makes rate changes based on scientific
risk determinations.
B.

Subsidies: The Remaining General Subsidies Should Gradually Be
Phased Out.

In 2014, Congress restored some, though not all, of the general
subsidies. Specifically, as noted above, it restored the “old house”
subsidies and the grandfathering subsidies.369 It repealed the sale trigger
provision so that if a house with a subsidized policy was sold, the
subsidized rate would continue, whereas the 2012 reforms had said that
subsidies would end when homes were sold.370 But the 2014 law did
continue the gradual elimination of subsidies for second homes, severe
repetitive loss properties, and businesses.371 It also added a surcharge on
all policies to make up for the cost of the continued subsidies.372
When Congress revisits the NFIP in 2017, 49 years after starting it,
Congress should pass legislation that gradually eliminates the subsidies.
After five decades, it is appropriate to ask when subsidies will end and to
ask for an explanation from those who want to continue them.
Subsidies should gradually end for at least three reasons. First, they
create illogical incentives, particularly given climate change. Second,
the justification for subsidies and the solidaristic approach to flood
insurance they reflect is weaker than in other contexts where the federal
government has been involved in insurance. Third, risk-based rates will
366.
§ 18, 128 Stat. at 1027 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4017(a), 4104(f)).
367.
There is no necessary reason why the mapping must be done by FEMA; this
function could perhaps be contracted out at some point and with new technology might
become increasingly easy and inexpensive. See generally Owen, supra note 30.
368.
Verchick & Johnson, supra note 274; Senate Takes First Step on Flood
Insurance, Agent Licensing Bill, supra note 354 (quoting Rep. Maxine Waters blaming
FEMA for rate increases).
369.
§ 4, 128 Stat. at 1022 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015).
370. § 3(b), 128 Stat. at 1021–22 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014).
371.
See supra Part III.B.1.b.iii.
372.
§ 8, 128 Stat. at 1023–24 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4015a, 4017a).
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likely bring private competition and state insurance regulation, which
will likely be overall more efficient and better for consumers than the
current system. As discussed in the next section, particularly given that
flood insurance is mandatory for mortgage-holders in flood zones, there
should be an “affordability” plan, but it should be targeted to the needy.
1.

The Incentives Created by the Current Subsidies Make No
Sense, Particularly Given Climate Change Risks.

Sea levels are rising and extreme weather events including flooding
are becoming more common. The risks of living on the coasts and by
certain rivers are increasing. There should be a compelling reason for
the government to incentivize citizens to live in flood zones, particularly
in older homes, but it has not been offered. A person owning an older
house that needs renovation or replacement benefits from not doing
extensive renovations on the house that might make it more floodresistant and is penalized for doing extensive renovations of a house.373
The NFIP encourages retention of and indeed inflates the value of older
homes near the water.374 It encourages building in flood-prone areas, yet
the federal government has no way to enforce restrictions on
development in floodplains.375 These policies make little sense right now
given the risks we face.
On the other side of the issue, there is a massive denial of climate
change and resistance to planning for it.376 This Article accepts the
science supporting climate change and does not consider denial to be a
valid counterargument. However, even many who accept the science of
climate change nonetheless support the subsidies.377 Supporters of the
subsidies, even if they do not say so openly, tend to hold that the
discounted insurance is positive and should be continued because it is
important to real estate market stability and homeowners who have relied
on the subsidies for decades. Federal disaster aid, including rebuilding
aid, is essential and simply part of what governments should do.378
Increased costs of insurance are negative because they tamp down and

373.
See supra Part II.C.
374.
See supra Part II.C.
375.
See supra Part II.A, C; Kildow & Scorse, supra note 22.
376.
See, e.g., Engaging Diverse Audiences with Climate Change, supra note 191
(manuscript at 16–27).
377.
See supra note 348 (discussing the statement of Sen. Menendez).
378.
Federal disaster aid in some cases has been used to rebuild roads and properties
repeatedly. See, e.g., Justin Gillis & Felicity Barringer, As Coasts Rebuild and U.S. Pays,
Repeatedly, the Critics Ask Why, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/science/earth/as-coasts-rebuild-and-us-pays-againcritics-stop-to-ask-why.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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threaten to destroy the real estate market.379 Reflecting its dependence
on government subsidies in some regions, the real estate industry
vociferously opposed the rate increases called for by the 2012 reforms. 380
The reasons that the real estate industry in flood-prone areas should be
particularly supported in this way have not been explained. The
subsidies and government rebuilding allow homeowners and the real
estate industry to not bear the costs of the risks they face. Instead,
taxpayers ultimately share those costs, which are bound to go up.
Precisely why the real estate industry and homeowners in these areas
should receive this largesse indefinitely has not been made clear.
2.

The Justification for Subsidies and the Current Solidaristic
Approach to Flood Insurance is Weaker Than in Other
Contexts Where the Federal Government Has Been Involved
in Insurance.

A second reason why the general subsidies should be phased out is
that the argument for the federal government to continue with the
solidaristic approach, justifying these subsidies, is weaker than in other
contexts where the federal government takes a solidaristic approach to
insurance. Three examples of federal involvement with insurance in
urban areas, reinsurance for riots and crime, unemployment insurance,
and health insurance, are contexts where the federal government has
been involved in insurance that contrast with the federal government’s
involvement with flood insurance.
a.

Federal Reinsurance for Riots: Fair Access to Insurance
Requirements Plans

At the same time that Congress passed the Flood Act to deal with a
void in the private insurance market for floods, it passed a law to deal
with a void in the private insurance market in urban areas. This was the
Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968 (“UPPRA”).381
Both before and after the urban riots in 1966, inner cities faced a crisis in
379.
See, e.g., Jeff Harrington, Premiums Rising for National Flood Program,
Though Florida Pales in Payouts, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 15, 2013, 4:30 AM),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/banking/premiums-rising-for-national-floodprogram-though-florida-pales-in-payouts/2126888; Mauriello, supra note 322; Harwell,
supra note 320.
380.
Opinion, Flooding Capitol Hill: Republicans Cave to the Realtors on Taxpayer
Flood Insurance, supra note 320.
381.
Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448,
82 Stat. 555 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749bbb to 1749bbb-21 (1976)), amended by
Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-557, 92
Stat. 2080.
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the lack of affordable insurance for homes.382 Congress responded by
passing the UPPRA, which authorized states to pass Fair Access to
Insurance Requirements (“FAIR”) plans and provided federal riot
reinsurance to companies who participated in these plans.383 These FAIR
plans primarily were aimed at making affordable property insurance
more readily available in urban areas.384 FAIR plans varied by state but
had to meet basic federal requirements in order for participating
companies to receive federal reinsurance for riots. In 1970, the law was
amended to authorize the Secretary of the HUD to offer federal insurance
against burglary and theft.385 The arrangements were not perfect, of
course, but worked reasonably well.386 Eventually, private reinsurers
returned to the market, and Congress terminated the riot reinsurance
program in 1985.387 Riots are now covered under standard homeowner
policies.388
The federal reinsurance for riots and federal crime insurance were
invented to deal with a national emergency, widespread urban decline
that threatened the survival of U.S. cities.389 Incentivizing insurance
companies to offer insurance in cities was an action called for by the
National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas.390 The
case for federal involvement was strong. Insurance companies had been
redlining whole areas, refusing to insure them and contributing
significantly to their decline.391 The cities and states did not have the

382.
Joanne Dwyer, Fair Plans: History, Holtzman and the Arson-for-Profit Hazard,
7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 617, 623, 626 (1978); PRESIDENT’S NAT’L ADVISORY PANEL ON INS.
IN RIOT-AFFECTED AREAS, 94TH CONG., MEETING THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CITIES
32 (1968) [hereinafter ADVISORY PANEL ON INS. REPORT]; Alan S. Kaplinsky, Insurance
in Urban Areas: An Analysis of Recent Statutory Solutions, 10 B.C. L. REV. 650, 650–653
(1969).
383.
Dwyer, supra note 382, at 626.
384.
§ 1103, 82 Stat. at 558 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb–3(b) (1994)).
385.
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, § 602(b),
(d), 84 Stat. 1770, 1788–89 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb-2(a)(2), -10a(b) (1994)).
386.
Dwyer, supra note 382, at 632–37.
387.
12 U.S.C. § 1749bbb(b) (1994); BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42716, TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE: ISSUE ANALYSIS AND OVERVIEW OF CURRENT
PROGRAM 11 (2014).
388. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-179, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE:
MULTIPLE CHALLENGES MAKE EXPANDING PRIVATE COVERAGE DIFFICULT 9 (2014).
389.
See Dwyer, supra note 382, at 617–23, 626.
390.
Dwyer, supra note 382, at 617; ADVISORY PANEL ON INS. REPORT, supra note
382, at 32. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders set up the distinct
National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas, which later endorsed the
report of the Advisory Panel on Insurance. OTTO KERNER ET AL., REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 15 (1968); Dwyer, supra note
382, at 617.
391.
Dwyer, supra note 382 at 618–21; ADVISORY PANEL ON INS. REPORT, supra
note 382, at 10.
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resources to stabilize the situation.
The federal government’s
involvement was targeted and limited both in scope and in time. The
federal government did not take over the underwriting risk. Instead, it
created incentives for states to prod insurance companies to shoulder
some of the risk because of the importance of the coverage. It also
provided a reward in the form of federal reinsurance for companies
which took some of the risk.
b.

Federal Unemployment Insurance

Federal legislation passed in 1935 encouraged states to adopt their
own unemployment insurance laws, and all states have done so.392 This
was one of the measures taken by Congress to try to counteract the
effects of the Great Depression.393 It aimed to fill a void in the private
market; there was no private unemployment insurance available on the
market, apparently because of concern about moral hazard and the
challenge of distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary
unemployment.394 The structure was that there would be a payroll tax on
the vast majority of employees and that those who participated in a
satisfactory state unemployment insurance program could deduct the full
amount of their state contributions from the federal tax.395 The goals
were to help stabilize the economy and lessen individual hardship from
job loss that was not the individual’s fault.396 While largely financed
through a payroll tax on employers, when economic downturns continue,
the federal government has supplemented payments, at times in the
billions of dollars.397 Debates continue to focus on costs and benefits,
whether its financing structure makes sense,398 and moral hazard.399

392.
MOSS, supra note 16, at 197–98; Unemployment Insurance 75th Anniversary,
DEP’T LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ocia/pdf/75th-Anniversary-Summary-FINAL.pdf (last
visited Oct. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Fact Sheet, Unemployment Insurance].
393.
It was part of the Social Security Act. MOSS, supra note 16, at 180, 197.
394.
MOSS, supra note 16, at 188–91.
395.
Id. at 193–94 (discussing the adopted tax-offset scheme).
396. Unemployment Insurance, Fact Sheet, supra note 392.
397.
Wesley Lowery, Advocates Renew Efforts to Urge Congress to Extend
Unemployment
Benefits,
WASH.
POST
(June
10,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/advocates-renew-efforts-to-urge-congress-toextend-unemployment-benefits/2014/06/10/2224da50-eff0-11e3-914c1fbd0614e2d4_story.html.
398.
See Brian D. Galle, Myopia, Fiscal Federalism, and Unemployment Insurance:
Time to Reform UI Financing 1, 2–3 (Boston Coll. Law Sch. Legal Studies, Research
Paper
No.
265,
2012),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2031728; Wayne Vroman, Financing
Unemployment Insurance After the Great Recession, UNEMPLOYMENT & RECOVERY
PROJECT (Urban Inst., D.C.), Aug. 2012, at 1, 2, available at
http://www.urban.org/publications/412639.html; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
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States can and do vary their laws, and the laws have very wide coverage.
But the need for stabilizing the economy was (and at times, is)
compelling, and federal unemployment insurance plays this role.400
States, cities, employers, and the private insurance market do not have
the wherewithal to deal with economic consequences of unemployment,
and the federal unemployment insurance program helps steady the
economy.401 Further, it spreads a risk that is not in control of individuals
and that almost everyone faces.
c.

Affordable Care Act

The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) was passed in 2010; at that time,
40 million Americans did not have health insurance, many states had not
been able to deal with the problems of uninsured Americans,402 and there
was a consensus across the political spectrum that reform was needed so
that more Americans would have health insurance.403 While the
Affordable Care Act is a behemoth reflecting myriad policies, it contains
a web of complex subsidies, linked with mandates, in service of the idea
that health care is important to everyone in our society and that risk
sharing through insurance is a way to pay for it.404 Although concerns
are raised about costs, bureaucracy, and other aspects,405 it is a context
where government getting involved in insurance markets makes sense.
The risk of illness is universally shared although not evenly distributed;

GAO-10-440, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS: LONG-STANDING STATE
FINANCING POLICIES HAVE INCREASED RISK OF INSOLVENCY (2010).
399.
See, e.g., Arthur Delaney, Conservatives Credit End of Benefits for Declining
Unemployment
Rate,
HUFFPOST
POL.
(Jul.
7,
2014,
4:17
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/07unemployment-extension_n_5564019.html.
400.
Galle, supra note 398, at 2–3.
401.
Id.
402. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2612 (2012) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Brief of
Health Care for All, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners Urging Reversal on
the Minimum Coverage Provision Issue at 4, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 160242, at *4.
403.
Kenneth S. Abraham & Daniel Schwarz, Health Care Supplement to
Abraham’s Insurance Law & Regulation 12 (5th ed. 2010)
404.
See generally Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility after the
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2011).
405.
Recently in lawsuits that challenged the propriety of some of the law’s
subsidies, one divided federal appeals court held the subsidies unauthorized by the
statute, and another federal appeals court held the subsidies authorized by the law. Abby
Goodnough, Ruling on Health Care Subsidies Puts Coverage at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Jul.
23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/us/politics/court-ruling-on-health-caresubsidies-risks-loss-of-coverage.html.
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public health concerns support wide provision of health care to
citizens.406
These three contexts, insurance in urban areas, federal
unemployment insurance, and the ACA, present more compelling
reasons for federal government involvement in insurance than does flood
insurance. With urban reinsurance and FAIR plans, swaths of entire
cities were at risk, and insurance company conduct wrote off large areas
to the detriment of targeted populations and cities as a whole. Helping
insure those areas and properties made tremendous sense and did not
create moral hazard concerns. This differs radically from federal flood
insurance where moral hazard is significant, as well as other problematic
incentives created by the NFIP. Federal involvement in urban property
insurance, also unlike flood insurance, was limited and temporary.
Federal unemployment insurance is mostly paid for by employers’
payroll tax deductions; it is only when the economy truly nosedives that
the federal government gets involved. This, too, differs from federal
flood insurance where the federal government underwrites the entire risk.
Finally, under the ACA, securing health care and health insurance to all
citizens through market intervention makes sense from a policy and
humanitarian perspective. Flood insurance subsidies as presently
structured do not have these benefits, and they have negative
consequences as outlined above.
3.

Accurate Maps and Risk-Based Rates May Bring More Private
Competition and State Insurance Regulation Which Overall
Will Be Positive.

The general subsidies should gradually be phased out because they
hamper the private market’s ability to provide basic homeowners flood
coverage.407 Once the maps are completed and Congress definitively sets
a timetable for the subsidies to be gradually eliminated, private insurance
will likely expand in the market for basic homeowners coverage.
Lloyd’s offers some basic private flood insurance in Florida; other
insurers are offering similar coverage.408 Congress should continue to
406.
The Affordable Care Act is solidaristic with some actuarial elements, such as
allowing specific price differentials for individual policies by four factors: family status,
geographic region, age, and tobacco use. 45 C.F.R. § 147.102(a)(1)(i)–(iv) (2013).
407. GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4, at 25; GAO,
2007 NATURAL CATASTROPHE INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 189, at 5–6.
408. See Jeff Harrington, Battling Flood Insurance Rate Hikes Without Government
Help,
TAMPA
BAY
TIMES
(Jan.
12,
2014,
12:49
PM),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/banking/battling-flood-insurance-rate-hikeswithout-government-help/2160697 (reporting that Lloyd’s of London is now offering
flood insurance in Florida); Jay MacDonald, Lower-Cost Flood Options Flow In,
BANKRATE
(Apr.
25,
2014,
6:00
AM),
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encourage private sector involvement and offer policies with variety,
such as the high-deductible option mentioned in the 2014 reforms. 409
Private insurers are better at some aspects of risk reduction than federal
or state governments.410 If rates are based on risk, better risk-modeling
information will become available, resulting in healthy competition
between insurers.411 Private companies’ data collection about risk, their
nuanced rate-making, and the individual attention that can be provided
by producers all mean that they may be able to offer more variety in
products and better rates than the standard federal flood policy.412
Further, while insurance remains regulated by the states, consumerfriendly insurance-law doctrines will apply to private flood insurance.413
Although flood risk is a difficult risk to insure, there is flood insurance
available for some properties above the federal limits as well as
commercial insurance.414 Making it easier for the private market to
expand will not be a panacea, and the federal government might still
need to play a role, for example, in providing reinsurance, but it would
be an improvement over the current system.415
C.

Affordability: Congress Should Pass an “Affordability” Plan, But
It Should Be Limited and Targeted Towards the Needy.

Flood insurance is both mandated and subsidized in certain
geographical areas: federal law mandates it for mortgage holders in

http://www.bankrate.com/financing/insurance/lloyds-offers-viable-flood-option/; Private
Market Could Grow as Government Flood Insurance Prices Rise: Fitch, INS. J. (Mar. 6,
2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/03/06/322380.htm; Leslie
Scism, Private Insurers Start to Offer Flood Coverage, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2014, 3:38
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304834704579405082969457564.
409. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, §
12, 128 Stat. 1020, 1025 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4013(d)) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
4013 to provide that the Administrator shall make available policies with deductibles of
up to and including $10,000).
410. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How
Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 224 n.85 and accompanying
text (2012) (providing example of private insurers using hurricane shutters to reduce
insurance premiums). As noted earlier, the federal government does not control local or
state land use and decisions on the local level are often politicized. See supra Part I.A.4.
411. GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–12.
412. See generally id.; GAO, 2007 NATURAL CATASTROPHE INSURANCE REPORT,
supra note 189.
413. See Scales, supra note 3, at 24–25, 33–34.
414. Private Market Could Grow as Government Flood Insurance Prices Rise: Fitch,
supra note 408 (reporting that private market for flood insurance consists largely of
commercial flood insurance and insurance over the federal limits).
415. See generally GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4,
at 1.
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flood zones and provides subsidies for many homes in those zones. 416
There are good reasons for the mandate417 but weak reasons for the
general subsidies.418 For low-income residents of high-risk areas who
have mortgages and are thus subject to the mandate, however, the
gradual subsidy elimination would be “overly burdensome.”419 This
creates a need for some sort of an affordability plan.
The 2012 reforms called for a study to be done by the National
Academy of Sciences to analyze methods of establishing an affordability
framework “through targeted assistance rather than generally subsidized
rates, including means-tested vouchers.”420 The 2014 reforms expanded
the provisions about affordability, requiring the FEMA administrator to
prepare a draft framework to address “the issues of affordability of flood
insurance sold under the [NFIP], including issues identified in the
affordability study.”421 The FEMA administrator, in developing his
affordability plan, is required to consider several criteria, including
“targeted assistance to flood policyholders based on their financial ability
to continue to participate in the [NFIP]” and “the impact flood insurance
rate map updates have on the affordability of flood insurance.”422 The
2014 reforms increased the amount of money allotted for the study to
$2.5 million from $750,000 and required the study be submitted within
18 months.423 The 2014 law’s provisions about the affordability study
are complex and unlikely to result in a clear answer as to what Congress
should do about affordability.424 It is a mistake, then, to wait for the
“affordability” study without independently considering what should be
done.
What are the arguments for an affordability plan for flood
insurance, since normally the owner can sell if the costs of owning an
asset become too high? There are three arguments, as expert Carolyn
Kousky explains, in discussing state natural catastrophe insurance
programs.425 One is a political response to subsidize “vocal, high-risk
416. See supra Parts I.A.4, I.B.2, I.B.4.
417. See supra Parts I.B.4, III.A.1.d (explaining that the mandate was passed because
without it demand was too low for program to be viable).
418. See supra Part IV.B.
419. GAO, 2013 SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES REPORT, supra note 3, at 36.
420. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12), Pub. L. 112141, § 100236(a)(3), 126 Stat. 405, 957.
421. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, §
9(a), 128 Stat. 1020, 1024; see supra Part III.B.1.c.
422. § 9(b)(2), (5), 128 Stat. at 1024.
423. See supra note 283 (providing specifics about the study).
424. See supra Part III.B.1.c; supra note 283.
425. Carolyn Kousky, Managing the Risk of Natural Catastrophes: The Role and
Functioning of State Insurance Programs 14 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No.
RFF DP 10-30, 2010), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-10-30.pdf.
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residents.”426 This is essentially what Congress did with the majority of
subsidies in 2014. Yet, there is hope for a more reflective response in the
future. The second argument, Kousky explains, is “an equity argument:
some low-income homeowners reside in high-hazard areas, and it is a
government role to help these homeowners afford insurance, just as
society subsidizes their food and health care.”427 The third is an
economic argument:
[I]nsurance . . . is necessary for development, and some types of
development must be in high-risk areas but provide economic
spillovers that justify insurance subsidies. The extent to which this is
the case is a difficult empirical question that to my knowledge has not
been thoroughly addressed but would likely justify only very small
and targeted subsidies in any event.428

What we have, of course, are not small and targeted subsidies but
large and general subsidies. The only strong argument for subsidies,
then, is the equity argument that would extend subsidies to poor people
as part of government’s role in subsidizing food, health care, and
housing. The existing general federal flood insurance subsidies for older
homes and grandfathered homes in flood-prone areas were not targeted at
people with low incomes or limited assets. The subsidies covered some
people with low incomes and limited assets. However, these subsidies
also covered homeowners who were not poor or middle class.429
Wealthy people with older oceanfront homes have received massive
subsidies for almost 50 years; if the home is their primary residence, they
will still receive the subsidies. Homeowners’ property insurance rates
generally vary by degree of risk, including building materials and
exposure to catastrophes; by contrast, flood risk, for no good reason,
enjoys a most favored risk status.430 The GAO, informed organizations,
and academic experts have suggested a way out of the current
unacceptable situation. Those organizations and experts argue that
Congress should gradually eliminate subsidized rates and charge full
rates to everyone but also fund a means-tested subsidy for some
policyholders.431 The most detailed plan was developed by Professor
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 14–15.
429. See supra Part III.A.1.b, III.B.1.c; see also supra text accompanying notes 231–
43.
430. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-179, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE:
MULTIPLE CHALLENGES MAKE EXPANDING PRIVATE COVERAGE DIFFICULT 5 (2014).
431. See, e.g., GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4, at
18 ; GAO, 2011ACTION NEEDED REPORT, supra note 68, at 60 (2011) (suggesting general
subsidies be eliminated but Congress provide assistance to needy homeowners to help
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Howard Kunreuther and his colleagues. They propose a means-tested
program coupled with loans for mitigation renovations that would be a
large improvement over the status quo.432
One question that Congress should consider if it decides to institute
a means-tested plan is what agency will administer the plan and
determine who is eligible? After all, FEMA’s programs are not meanstested. The Department of Homeland Security, of which FEMA is a part,
does not administer means-tested programs. Thus, the question arises as
to whether FEMA or another agency would administer the means test.433
The plan by Kunreuther and his colleagues calls for a system where
mitigation is encouraged by low-cost loans for mitigation coupled with
lower insurance rates.434 This would require on-the-ground involvement
by the NFIP, on a property-by-property level all over the country, which
would be very expensive at first, but ultimately would improve the
program and reduce overall costs.435
Another issue involves setting an appropriate cut-off level. How
limited are the means that would entitle a person to a voucher or benefit
from the plan?436 Providing means-tested insurance to a limited number
pay the premiums); Ass’n of State Floodplain Managers, Inc., Flood Insurance
Affordability: ASFPM Recommendations to Address the Impact of NFIP Reform 2012
(BW-12),
FLOODS.ORG
2
(April
26,
2013),
http://www.floods.org/acefiles/documentlibrary/2012_NFIP_Reform/ASFPM_recommendations_on_BW12_affordability_26April2013.pdf (calling for means-tested program); KUNREUTHER &
MICHEL-KERJAN, supra note 3, at 333 (suggesting voucher program similar to food
stamps); Kousky & Kunreuther, supra note 246, at 3 (proposing voucher program linked
to mitigation measures); Andrew G. Simpson, Groups Urge Congress to Target Flood
Insurance Fix to Help Needy, Not Wealthy, INS. J., (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/01/09/316502.htm.
432. Kousky & Kunreuther, supra note 246, at 1; KUNREUTHER & MICHEL-KERJAN,
supra note 3, at 333.
433. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-221, MEANS-TESTED
PROGRAMS: INFORMATION ON PROGRAM ACCESS CAN BE AN IMPORTANT
MANAGEMENT TOOL 6–8 (2005) (providing examples of means-tested programs and
agencies that administer them, including Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, Head
Start, Medicaid (administered by the Department of Health and Human Services),
housing choice vouchers, public housing (administered by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development), food stamps and the Women, Infants and Children Program
(administered by the Agriculture Department), the Earned Income Tax Credit
(administered by the Internal Revenue Service and the Education Department), and the
Supplemental Security Income program (administered by the Social Security
Administration)).
434. Kousky & Kunreuther, supra note 246, at 3 (proposing voucher program linked
to mitigation measures).
435. Another question is what would be the means that would be tested? Would
income, assets, home value, or a combination of the three be used? Income data are more
readily available than asset data through tax returns. Home value data are available from
state real estate taxing authority; but home value data would not easily apply to renters.
Asset data might be the most difficult to obtain.
436. Kousky, supra note 425, at 14–15.
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of policyholders would have benefits, but it could have drawbacks as
well. For example, if the plan provides below-cost insurance, it may lead
to unwise development much as in the current system.437
Examples from the federal flood program itself and from state plans
offering property insurance for high-risk policyholders who have trouble
finding insurance in the regular market all suggest the affordability plan
should be small and limited. Regarding the federal flood program itself,
there has been very little private homeowners coverage for floods for at
least 50 years.438 One of the reasons for this is that flood is a challenging
risk to insure. Moreover, the federally subsidized rates have made it
difficult for private insurers to compete.439 Better information about risk,
for example, through advanced computer modeling, will enable
companies to price insurance in line with risk; but if existing subsidies
continue, insurers may not bother to expand into the homeowners flood
insurance market.440
State-subsidized property insurance for high-risk policyholders can
easily balloon beyond its original narrow goal. Many states in the 1970s
established plans incentivizing insurance companies to cover urban
properties they were otherwise unwilling to insure.441 Since then, many
of these plans have been shifted by legislation from insuring urban
properties to insuring high-risk coastal areas.442 With these coastal
insurance plans, rates are often subject to political manipulation and are
not based on risk.443 This can lead to private insurers exiting the market,
reduced choice for policyholders, unwise development in coastal areas,
and costs shared among all taxpayers.444 None of the state FAIR plans,
or other state natural disaster plans, are targeted toward low-income
residents, so no plan presents an adequate model.445 This situation,
where below-cost insurance offered by the state to fill a market void but
expands, crowding out private insurers and resulting in the state

437. Kousky, supra note 425, at 15.
438. See supra Part I.
439. See generally GAO, 2014 PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT REPORT, supra note 4,
at 1.
440. Id. at 10–12, 18.
441. Dwyer, supra note 382, at 617; ROBERT P. HARTWIG & CLAIRE WILKINSON, INS.
INFO. INST., RESIDUAL MARKET PROPERTY PLANS: FROM MARKETS OF LAST RESORT TO
MARKETS
OF
FIRST
CHOICE
3
(2013),
available
at
http://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/ResidualMarketWhitePaper-20131.pdf; see supra
Part IV.B.2.a (describing FAIR plans).
442. HARTWIG & WILKINSON, supra note 441, at 21.
443. Id. at 21, 23–24.
444. Id. at 25–27.
445. Kousky, supra note 425, at 14–15.
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becoming the major insurer for that risk, is an example of what Congress
should seek to avoid as it develops an affordability plan.446
Many strong reasons call for gradually eliminating the existing
subsidies, but for low-income policyholders, risk-based rates may be
overly burdensome. While Congress may be tempted to wait until the
“affordability study” is done before it makes decisions about the
subsidies, it should not wait because the study is likely to raise more
questions than answers. The only strong argument for an affordability
plan is the equitable argument that part of government’s role is to assist
low-income people, in flood insurance as in other arenas like food and
health care. Therefore a means-tested plan should accompany the
elimination of subsidies, as the GAO and experts have said for years.
This would be a partially solidaristic approach to flood insurance based
on the justification of need, unlike the current approach which does not
have such a grounding.447 Congress needs to craft the plan carefully so
that it does not repeat the problems of the existing program (for example,
if the cutoff is too high) and could use this opportunity to create a limited
plan that would encourage mitigation and perhaps result in lower future
losses.
D.

Congress Should Pass a Framework to Deal with the Long-Term
Effects of Climate Change.

The original flood insurance law called for a comprehensive
approach to floodplain management and national flood policy.448 That in
itself is a very challenging goal even if there was political consensus to
reach it. Given many factors such as the multi-faceted structure of our
government, geographical diversity, climate change denial, and changing
risks, it seems likely to be an elusive goal. However, Congress could at
least strongly encourage dissemination of flood risk information so that
flood risk becomes and remains more salient and so that more people are
willing to buy insurance and take steps to reduce risk. If the climate
change risks unfold as predicted, comprehensive, coordinated, and

446. Similar outcomes have resulted in the auto insurance context where residual
market plans aimed at high-risk policyholders have offered such attractive rates that the
residual market becomes the largest insurer in the state, resulting in devastating financial
consequences. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 590 A.2d 191, 196 (N.J.
1991).
447. O’NEILL & O’NEILL, supra note 5, at 6–7 (asserting that solidaristic approaches
to government insurance are generally based on a broad justification such as need).
448. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1302(c), 82 Stat.
572, 573 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c) (2012)) (“The Congress further finds that . . .
(2) the objectives of a flood insurance program should be integrally related to a unified
national program for flood plain management . . . .”).
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drastic measures will need to be taken.449 Floods are not the only
relevant risk, but, if Congress can manage to develop a comprehensive
yet nuanced plan to respond to floods,450 perhaps it could be a step
towards facing other climate change challenges.
CONCLUSION
Floods and flood risk present huge dilemmas particularly in light of
climate change, which is likely to bring more severe and frequent floods.
The federal government has been the underwriter of homeowners’ basic
flood insurance coverage since 1968. Flood insurance is challenging for
many reasons, including the arduousness of determining flood risks, the
correlated nature of flood losses, the widespread tendency to discount the
magnitude of risks like floods, and the federal government’s limited
enforcement authority over state and local decisions that affect the risk.
It has taken on the role of underwriting a risk that is very difficult to
insure by offering a product that people have to be compelled to buy
even when it is sold at half-price. The NFIP currently owes the Treasury
Department $24 billion. This article has analyzed the NFIP as it
developed from its start in 1968 to the 2012 and 2014 reforms. Congress
has always had inconsistent goals for the NFIP and has taken a range of
approaches to flood insurance. The program’s initial solidaristic
approach, which featured general subsidies for the oldest and riskiest
properties, has been widely criticized. A spectrum of critics found fault
with the NFIP’s finances, environmental impacts, mapping, and
incentives, which encouraged building and discouraged replacement of
flood-prone buildings in high-risk areas.
In 2012, Congress, by a wide bipartisan majority, reformed the
NFIP, moving it towards an actuarial approach where all rates eventually
would be based on flood risk, subsidies would be phased out, and maps
would be revised based solely on science. This would encourage private
insurers to market basic homeowners flood insurance coverage and result
in homeowners bearing the risk of their properties’ location. The 2012
reforms seemed modest at the time but were greeted by a huge
counterreaction from outraged constituents and the real estate industry.
449. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 199, at 69; Verchick & Johnson, supra note 274
(manuscript at 2).
450. Alliances between insurance groups and environmental groups are part of the
impetus for change. See, e.g., Josh Saks & Jimi Grande, Flood Insurance Vote
Underscores Need for National Mitigation Strategy | Commentary, ROLL CALL (Apr.
21,
2014,
5:00
AM),
http://www.rollcall.com/news/flood_insurance_vote_underscores_need_for_national_mit
igation_strategy-232238-1.html. Josh Saks is legislative director for the National
Wildlife Federation, and Jimi Grande is senior vice president of Federal and Political
Affairs for the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies.
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In 2014, Congress changed direction, rescinded many reforms, and added
others, returning in significant part to the solidaristic approach of the
initial 1968 program. This Article has explained why the 2012 reforms
passed and why the 2014 “reforms of the reforms” passed.
The Article offers recommendations for Congress when it
reconsiders the NFIP in 2017. Congress must provide leadership and
consider the long-term consequences of its actions if the NFIP is going to
move beyond its current status as a debtor program with, on balance,
unfortunate consequences. First, the mapping must be protected from
political influence. Second, the solidaristic approach of the general
subsidies is not based on the need of the recipients or any other
compelling policy. So the remaining general subsidies, which have
lasted decades longer than intended by Congress, need to be phased out.
The incentives they create to build and fail to replace or renovate older
properties make little sense; they burden all taxpayers regardless of flood
risk. The justification for these enduring subsidies are weaker than in
other contexts where the federal government has been involved in
insurance such as riot reinsurance, unemployment insurance, and health
insurance. Third, risk-based rates and accurate maps would probably
bring more private insurance and competition, which likely would be
better for consumers. Fourth, Congress should pursue a limited
solidaristic approach, particularly since the insurance is mandated for
mortgage holders in flood zones. To do this, Congress should pass a
limited means-tested affordability plan linked to mitigation. Broadly,
Congress should encourage much more wide dissemination of
information about flood risk so that it becomes more salient across the
population. Finally, ideally, Congress should pass a comprehensive plan
to deal with floods and other likely consequences of climate change.
Any of these steps would be an improvement.
The 2012 and 2014 federal flood insurance reform boomerang can
be seen as a lesson in practical politics where the real estate industry and
“vocal, high-risk” constituents451 affected by long overdue reforms
flexed their muscles and got a result that benefits them financially but
that costs everyone else and the environment. Going forward, perhaps
the increased visibility of the flood insurance issue may prompt a deeper
analysis and more widespread understanding of the context and history
of the issues. The result should be a system that gradually moves
towards an actuarial approach where rates generally reflect risk, while a
limited, solidaristic plan assists the truly needy. There are no simple
solutions, but Congress could do much better.

451.

Kousky, supra note 425, at 14.

